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Understanding and Improving Use-Tax Compliance:  A Theory of Planned 
Behavior Approach 
 
Christopher Robert Jones 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study seeks to understand specific factors that are pertinent to individuals 
when making a use-tax compliance decision and to test a remedy to improve use-tax 
compliance. This study investigates use-tax compliance using a three-step approach.  The 
first step involved building a survey to determine potential salient beliefs that are 
pertinent to individuals when facing a use-tax compliance decision.  Results of the initial 
survey reveal that the effort of complying with the use tax, potential revenue to the state 
if the individual complies, fairness of the use tax, monetary concerns of the individual, 
perceived knowledge of the use tax, and social influences were the most mentioned 
factors contributing to individuals when making a use tax compliance decisions. 
The second step in this study develops a model, based on the Theory of Planned 
Behavior, incorporating these salient beliefs.  Results indicate that most of the salient 
beliefs identified in the survey were correlated to an individual’s attitude.   
 Finally, the third step involved testing two remedies.  The first remedy gave the 
individual the option to have the website automatically collect the use tax due.  The 
second examined remedy provided information to the participant regarding the use tax.  
Results indicated that the effort remedy developed, having the website give the individual 
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the choice whether the website will automatically collect the tax, does improve the 
likelihood the individual will comply with the use tax.  In addition, results also show 
compliance improves if participants are given information regarding the use tax.
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I.  Introduction 
This study seeks to understand specific factors that are pertinent to individuals 
when making a use-tax compliance decision and to test a remedy to improve use-tax 
compliance.  Specifically, I use a survey-based approach to determine salient factors of 
use-tax compliance.  Given the survey results, I design and experimentally test remedies 
that are expected to improve compliance. 
The use tax is similar in spirit to a sales tax.  It is a state tax a consumer pays to 
store, consume, or use an item in a particular geographic location (i.e., a state).1  A use 
tax is generally owed when an individual purchases an item “out of state” and does not 
pay any sales tax (or pays a sales tax of a lesser amount than what is charged in his or her 
state of residence).  It is important to note that it does not matter what the legal residence 
is for the person:  if he or she lives in a state temporarily (i.e., for school) and stores an 
item there, he or she is obligated to pay the use tax if (s)he did not pay a sales tax on the 
purchase.  Although there are numerous situations in which an individual could owe a use 
tax to his or her state of residence, in this study I focus on purchases made online since 
states continue to lose vast amounts of money due to untaxed internet purchases.   
The largest revenue source for state governments is the sales tax (Goolsbee and 
Zittrain 1999). States that have a sales tax generally also have some form of a use tax that 
is due only when the individual did not pay sales tax on a purchase.2  Traditional brick 
                                                 
1 The multistate tax commission defines a use tax as  "a nonrecurring tax, other than a sales tax, which (a) is 
imposed on or with respect to the exercise or enjoyment of any right or power over tangible personal 
property incident to the ownership, possession or custody of that property or the leasing of that property 
from another including any consumption, keeping, retention, or other use of tangible personal property and 
(b) is complementary to a sales tax” (Streamlined Sales Tax Project Website 2007). 
2 For instance, in Florida, residents are required to fill out Form DR-15MO quarterly and pay 6% tax on all 
purchases made out of state if the amount of tax owed is greater than $1.00 
2 
 
and mortar stores automatically collect the sales tax and remit it to the state, eliminating 
the need for the purchaser to pay the use tax.  Purchases made via the internet, however, 
are largely untaxed. Since internet vendors are rarely required to collect a sales tax for an 
out-of-state sale, it is left to the purchaser to pay any use tax in his or her state.  In 2004, 
it was estimated that by 2008 states would lose between $21.5 billion and $33.7 billion a 
year because of untaxed purchases made online (Bruce and Fox 2004).  Florida alone 
could lose as much as $2.3 billion, representing approximately eight percent of total 
revenue for Florida in 2008 (State of Florida Long-Range Financial Outlook 2008).3  Not 
only are states losing money, but residents in states are losing jobs because of uncollected 
use tax (Florida Tax Watch 2009).  Due to the economic significance of this revenue loss, 
it is important to examine both factors that influence use-tax compliance and ways to 
improve use-tax compliance.  
Although states recognize that untaxed internet sales continue to be a problem, 
few remedies exist due to the difficulties in monitoring and enforcement.  A typical 
internet transaction with use-tax implications would involve a person located in one state 
buying a product from a vendor in another state.  Currently, vendors are not required to 
collect use or sales taxes for a state unless they have a physical presence in the state 
(Quill Corp. vs. North Dakota 1992).4  Therefore, in order to enforce use-tax compliance 
for a specific purchase, a state would have to determine if a sales tax was collected at the 
point of sale, where the item was shipped, whether the item is in “use” in the state, and 
who would be responsible for paying the use tax.   
                                                 
3 Florida is currently projecting a budget deficit of $2.33 billion for 2008. 
4 The ruling in Quill Inc.vs.North Dakota determined that Quill Inc. did not need to collect a sales tax for 
catalog orders from North Dakota. 
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Despite the considerable amount of federal tax compliance research, there is a 
dearth of research on other types of taxes.  The use tax differs from the federal income 
tax in many potential ways.  For example, taxpayers may not be as aware of the use tax or 
the compliance requirements.   Federal income tax research has shown that raising the 
penalty and/or audit rate should improve compliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972).  
Given that very few people are aware the use tax even exists, it would serve little purpose 
to raise the penalty and/or audit rate – people still would not pay since they are not aware 
that they should pay.  Other potential differences between the two taxes include the fact 
that the use tax is a consumption based tax whereas the federal income tax is income 
based and the fact that the use tax is generally much smaller in amount than the federal 
income tax and could be deemed “immaterial” by the taxpayer.  Recent empirical 
research has begun to examine different taxes in addition to the federal income tax (e.g., 
Sanders et al. 2008).   
Given the multitude of potential differences, the use-tax compliance decision is 
likely to involve different psychological factors than the decision to comply with the 
federal income tax.  More specifically, each difference could alter the decision process 
for the individual.  Thus, an important first step in improving use-tax compliance is to 
identify factors associated with the use-tax compliance decision.     
This study investigates use-tax compliance using a three-step approach.  The first 
two steps create a model for use-tax compliance using the Theory of Planned Behavior 
(TPB) (Ajzen 1991). The TPB posits that actual behavior is based on a person’s intention 
to perform the behavior.  This intention, in turn, is based on three factors:  attitude 
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towards the behavior, subjective norms regarding the behavior, and perceived behavioral 
control.   
The first step in this study gathers factors that are pertinent to individuals when 
facing a use-tax compliance decision.  I develop a questionnaire based on Ajzen and 
Fishbein (1980) to determine the antecedents to attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control that are pertinent to individuals making a use-tax decision.  
The second step in this study develops a model, based on the TPB, incorporating 
these factors.  This approach serves two purposes.  First, it allows me to experimentally 
test if the factors identified in the questionnaire are in fact antecedents to use-tax 
compliance behavior.  Second, by using regression analysis, I can show the relative 
importance of each factor.  These first two steps have been used in many research 
settings.  Taylor and Todd (1995) used a similar approach to predict adoption of new 
technology.  They also used the approach to help predict composting behavior.  Bobek 
and Hatfield (2003) used a similar approach to explain federal income tax compliance.  
Bobek, Hatfield, and Wentzel (2007) use TPB to explore why people prefer a refund to 
having less tax withheld on their paycheck. 
The final step in this study involves developing and testing technology-based 
remedies aimed at changing the attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral 
control factors that are found to be pertinent to use-tax compliance behavior from steps 
one and two.  Specifically, this study examines a remedy where individuals are given the 
option to have the vendor’s website automatically collect the use-tax due.  In addition, 
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this study examined a remedy were the participant is simply given information on the use 
tax.   
Results of the initial survey reveal that the effort of complying with the use tax, 
potential revenue to the state if the individual complied, fairness of the use tax, monetary 
concerns of the individual, perceived knowledge of the use tax, and the fact that 
participants considered the use tax just “another tax” were the most mentioned factors 
influencing individuals’ use tax compliance decisions.  Accordingly, a model using these 
beliefs was developed and tested.   
Results of the model testing indicate that most of the salient beliefs identified in 
the survey were correlated to an individual’s attitude.  Specifically, effort involved in 
paying the use tax, fairness of the use tax, funding provided to the state, and the fact the 
use tax was considered just another tax were all significantly related to an individual’s 
attitude towards paying the use tax.  In addition, the attitude measure was positively 
correlated with intention to comply.   
The results of the remedy step indicate that the proposed remedies do increase the 
likelihood of use-tax compliance. 
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II. Background and Hypotheses 
Federal Income Tax Compliance 
The United States has a voluntary tax compliance system, and understanding what 
motivates consumers to voluntarily pay (or not pay) the federal income tax has been a 
focus of extensive investigation by researchers.  The official view of the IRS is that there 
are three dimensions of federal tax compliance:  filing, reporting, and payment 
compliance (IRS 2003).  Filing compliance refers to whether the taxpayer submitted the 
correct forms to the IRS.  Reporting compliance refers to whether the return was 
accurate.  Finally, payment compliance refers to whether the taxpayer paid his/her 
reported tax liability in a timely manner.  Based on the IRS’s definition of compliance, all 
three of these dimensions lead to a taxpayer being viewed as “non-compliant.”  Virtually 
all tax compliance research to date, however, has been restricted to situations in which a 
taxpayer intentionally pays less than the amount owed (i.e., payment compliance).  The 
motivation behind this stream of research is the large amount of tax revenue the U.S. has 
lost due to non-compliant behavior.  For the tax year 2001, the IRS estimated this amount 
to be to be $345 billion dollars (IRS 2006).5 
There are several reviews of federal income-tax compliance research (e.g., Long 
and Swingen 1991; Cuccia 1994; Jackson and Milliron 1986).  Jackson and Milliron 
(1986), the broadest and most comprehensive study, provide a framework for 
understanding tax compliance by identifying individual variables (e.g., age, gender, and 
education), perception variables (e.g., fairness and social norms), and environmental 
                                                 
5 The IRS bases its current estimated tax gap on 2001 data.  The tax gap refers to the total difference 
between what is owed and what is being paid to the IRS. 
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variables (e.g., penalty and audit rate) that help to explain and potentially improve, 
federal income tax compliance.  Thus, while these reviews are helpful for understanding 
federal income tax compliance, they do not encompass all potential taxes since different 
taxes could make different factors more or less salient.   
Use and Sales-Tax Compliance 
Many states collect taxes on purchases made by residents in the form of sales and 
use taxes. A sales tax is a tax an individual pays upon purchase of a tangible item.  A use 
tax is a tax an individual pays to utilize, store, or consume an item in a particular location. 
The individual who purchases the item is generally responsible for complying with all 
applicable use-tax laws. A sales tax differs from a use tax in that retailers (as opposed to 
the buyer) are generally held responsible for collecting and enforcing the sales tax. When 
an individual buys and does not pay a sales tax in the state in which the individual plans 
to use the item, the individual may be required to file a use-tax return and pay a use tax. 
This situation is common when an individual places an order through a catalog or online 
store where the retailer is located in a different state and will not collect the local sales 
tax.   Perhaps the easiest and most convenient method of collecting the use tax would be 
to have the state force the vendor to automatically collect payment.  However, the 
Supreme Court (in Quill Corp. vs. North Dakota 1992) ruled that a vendor is not required 
to collect the use tax for a state unless the vendor has nexus, a physical presence, in the 
state.   
The largest revenue source for state governments is the sales tax (Goolsbee and 
Zittrain 1999). States that have a sales tax generally also have some form of a use tax. For 
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example, in the state of Florida use tax is due on purchases if the amount of tax owed is 
greater than $1.00.  Compliance requirements for the use tax vary from state to state.  For 
example, many states (e.g., New York) have a use-tax line item on their state income tax 
form.  Other states have separate forms that must be completed.  For example, in Florida, 
a resident must submit a form quarterly to comply with use-tax laws. 
 States continue to lose sales tax revenue because individuals make purchases 
online and avoid state sales tax, as these purchases made via the internet from out-of-state 
vendors remain largely untaxed.  In 2004 it was estimated that, within four years, states 
would lose between $21.5 billion and $33.7 billion in revenue annually due to untaxed 
purchases made online (Bruce and Fox 2004). A primary contributor to this trend is 
online auction sites such as eBay.  Uncollected sales and use taxes on eBay auctions have 
been estimated to be around $60 million annually (Albring et al. 2000), yet this figure 
appears conservative as individual states have just begun to disclose estimates of how 
much revenue is lost due to consumers not paying use taxes.6  For example, Maine has 
estimated it loses between $30-$100 million a year (Maine Revenue Services Website 
2007).  Information indicates that sales made via the internet continue to grow.  The U.S. 
Census Bureau recently released its 2006 E-Commerce Multi-sector report showing that 
retailers’ e-commerce sales increased by 22 percent in 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2008).  
The Streamlined Sales Tax Project and the Internet Tax Freedom Act 
The Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) is a project undertaken by many states 
to simplify sales and use-tax compliance, and has resulted in the Streamlined Sales and 
                                                 
6 Not all purchases on eBay require a person to pay the use tax.  Payment of the use tax depends on a 
number of factors including whether the seller was a business or individual and location of seller (Heckman 
2005). 
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Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).  This agreement allows companies to use computer 
programs (called “certified service providers”) to automatically determine the amount of 
tax to be collected from each customer and the state to which the tax should be paid.  The 
company then collects the use tax owed from the customer and remits it to the proper 
state.  Although the SSTP is voluntary, one incentive for participation is that compliant 
companies are allowed to keep a portion of the tax proceeds collected.7 Currently, 18 
states have adopted the SSUTA (United State Sales Tax Site 2008). Cornia et al. (2004, 
1) expressed doubt over whether the project would actually work, noting that “states are 
unlikely to adopt extensive reforms.” To date, there has been little empirical research 
addressing the Streamlined Sales Tax Project or the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax 
Agreement.   
Finally, it is important to address a common misconception involving collection 
of the use tax for online sales.  The Internet Tax Freedom Act (established in 1998) 
provides a ban on certain taxes being imposed.  Many people mistakenly believe that the 
act prohibits states from collecting a use tax on online sales.  This is not the case, as the 
act merely prohibits state and local governments from enacting internet-only taxes.  For 
example, a tax to send or receive e-mails is prohibited by the Internet Tax Freedom Act.  
Since a majority of states already collect a sales tax on non-internet sales, a use tax is not 
disallowed under the act.   
 
 
                                                 
7 A similar incentive is used to induce companies to remit sales tax collected in the state.  However, this 
plan has come under scrutiny due to the lost revenue being paid to companies as inducements (Druker 
2008). 
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Use Tax 
A majority of the literature available on taxing internet sales is descriptive in 
nature, focusing either on recent trends during the time period the article was written 
involving taxes and the internet (e.g., Fox and Murray 1997) or the growing problem of 
uncollected sales tax revenues for various states (McClure 1999; Tannenwald 2002).  
Many of these articles are now outdated, provide little more than opinion, and do not 
offer any empirical evidence about the causes of non-compliance or solutions that could 
be implemented to improve non-compliance. 
Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999) examine several issues in the debate on whether to 
tax internet sales. Their paper is not designed to test hypotheses related to the use tax, but 
several findings in the paper warrant further discussion.  One important contribution the 
article makes is in estimating the actual amount of revenue states are losing due to not 
taxing internet purchases. Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999) determined that states lost 
approximately $430 million in revenue due to untaxed internet purchases during 1998.   
In addition, the authors found that not taxing internet sales tends to favor the more 
affluent since richer and more highly-educated individuals tend to purchase online more 
often than poorer and lesser educated individuals.  Finally, the authors argue that the 
costs associated with taxing internet sales will probably be minimal after an initial system 
is in place. The authors suggest that software could simplify the collection and 
distribution of the appropriate taxes to the appropriate jurisdictions.   
While Goolsbee and Zittrain (1999) contribute to the initial discussion about the 
internet and state taxes, their study has limitations. The authors acknowledge that a lack 
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of measurable data required them to make numerous assumptions and estimates. Use of 
the internet for commerce has grown exponentially since their data were collected in 
1998, and the results in this study almost certainly underestimate the sales tax problem.  
Significantly, only five years later, Bruce and Fox (2004) predicted that electronic 
commerce would cost states at least $21.5 billion in lost sales tax revenue by 2008.  
Interestingly, Goolsbee (2000) suggests that internet sales are highly sensitive to sales tax 
rates, and online purchases might be reduced by 24 percent if use-tax laws were enforced.  
In addition, this article notes that people living in locations with higher sales-tax rates are 
more likely to purchase online.  Taken together, these facts suggest that people are using 
the internet to avoid paying taxes and that “forced” compliance would probably reduce 
sales via the internet. 
Sanders et al. (2008) examined use-tax compliance in the construction industry 
and found that making the taxpayer (i.e., construction firm) aware of the penalty 
associated with non-compliance of the use tax and having a representative of the firm 
sign an affidavit stating they have reviewed all appropriate use tax rules both increased 
compliance.   
One empirical article warranting discussion is Trandel (1991).  Written before the 
internet boom of the mid-1990s, this article deals with use-tax avoidance on cross-border 
sales in general.  As Trandel’s (1991, 315) analysis shows, “the ability of consumers to 
evade the use tax alters their behavior in a way that leads firms to charge lower prices.  
This reduces welfare loss created by the sellers’ market power, and implies that evasion 
can increase welfare, even when tax rates are adjusted to offset the effect of evasion on 
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tax revenue.”  Trandel is thus suggesting that, by not taxing internet sales, states and 
consumers ultimately benefit since the loss of customers from brick and mortar stores 
will cause these stores to reduce prices, in turn increasing the overall economic welfare 
for the individuals. 
In summary, states are forfeiting a vast stream of revenue by not enforcing the use 
tax.  The actual amount states stand to lose appears to be in constant flux, and the 
estimates can (and do) change dramatically based on the assumptions made by the 
investigators.  Significantly, consumers have come to recognize that they can avoid sales 
taxes by purchasing online.  Whether avoiding the use tax is simply due to a monetary 
incentive (i.e., not having to pay a tax) or other factors have not been investigated to date. 
Theory of Planned Behavior 
As research in tax compliance has progressed, it has moved beyond looking at one 
or two individual factors associated with a taxpayer’s compliance decision.  Instead, 
some research has attempted to build an integrated model of taxpayer compliance using 
multiple factors (Hanno and Violette 1996; Bobek and Hatfield 2003).8  The theory used 
to help build this “integrated model” is the TPB. 
The TPB suggests that the key factor in determining whether a person will engage 
in a certain behavior is the intention to perform the behavior itself.  This is intuitively 
easy to understand:  the greater the intention to perform the behavior, the more likely a 
person is to actually engage in the behavior.  The second key point behind the TPB is that 
it also suggests three key factors that are associated with the person’s intention to perform 
                                                 
8 Although the tenets of TPB can be used to explain any action, in psychology, the action in most TPB 
studies is generally something that “betters” the individual.  It could be argued that paying a use tax does 
not directly improve an individual, but rather betters society as a whole. 
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the action: a person’s attitude towards the behavior in question, social factors (termed 
“subjective norms”), and perceived behavioral control.  Subjective norms are how society 
influences an individual’s behavior.  Perceived behavioral control deals with the amount 
of control a person believes he has over a certain action. A key point is that it is also 
possible to determine antecedents of the attitude towards the behavior, allowing 
researchers to determine what specific factors influence the behavior of interest. This 
theory was originally discussed by one of the “founders” of the theory of reasoned action, 
Icek Ajzen, and has been validated in numerous studies since (e.g., Beck and Ajzen 1991; 
Taylor and Todd 1995).9  Bobek and Hatfield (2003) found evidence consistent with the 
model’s predictions for federal tax compliance intentions.  A generalized picture of the 
TPB model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
FIGURE 1 – General Model of the Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Numerous accounting studies have used the TPB, and its predecessor--the theory 
of reasoned action--to explain a decision choice (e.g., Cohen et al. 1991; Mauldin and 
                                                 
9 A complete literature review of the theory of planned behavior can be found in Ajzen (1991). 
Salient Beliefs 
Attitude towards 
compliance 
Intention Behavior Social Norms Peer Groups 
Perceived Behavioral 
Control 
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Arunachalam 2002).10  Hanno and Violette (1996) used the theory of reasoned action in a 
tax compliance setting and found that the theory explained taxpayer compliance 
decisions.  In general, most recent research uses the TPB instead of its predecessor, the 
theory of reasoned action.  However, both have been used to explain taxpayer federal 
compliance behavior, and are good starting points for an integrated model of tax 
compliance decisions.  In addition, the theory incorporates social factors and personal 
attitudes.  Therefore, the three factors used to explain intention in the TPB will be useful 
in determining use-tax compliance.   
To date, no research has examined the TPB in relation to the use tax.   Although 
federal tax compliance research has used the TPB, it is important to develop a model 
specific to the use tax.  As discussed in the introduction, the use tax differs from the 
federal income tax in many ways:   
• The use tax is paid on a completely self-reporting basis.  Although individuals 
do voluntarily comply with the federal income tax as well, the government is 
provided with numerous documents (e.g., W-2s, 1099s) that are used for 
verification purposes.  Since states do not receive verification of out-of-state 
purchases, the state would have no way of easily determining whether a 
resident is complying with the use tax.   
• The use tax is a consumption tax whereas the federal income tax is income-
based.  Taxpayers may view the fairness of a tax based on how much they 
spend differently than on how much they earn.   
                                                 
10 The only difference between the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behavior is that the 
former does not have perceived behavioral control as a determinant of intention. 
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• Taxpayers making multiple purchases are required to keep track of each 
instance, and, in certain states, file multiple use tax returns throughout the 
year versus the requirement for only one federal income tax return.  This 
potentially creates a burden for taxpayers to keep receipts for each purchase, 
know when and how to submit the use tax due, and how to comply correctly. 
• The use tax itself is a cash outlay increasing the cost of the item purchased, 
whereas the income tax is often withheld on earnings (a reduction to a cash 
inflow) and is potentially less salient since taxpayers never see the cash. 
• The state is the taxing authority, not the federal government.  Thus, revenues 
benefit the state the individual resides in rather than the broader federal 
government. 
• Taxpayers may not be as aware of the use tax or the compliance requirements; 
whereas, most individuals know of the IRS and the federal income tax. 
Individuals may perceive getting taxed by their state differently than getting 
taxed by a federal government for numerous reasons including different 
enforcement procedures, the individual’s knowledge of each, and differing 
opinions of federal and state governments. 
Given the numerous differences between the income tax and the use tax, it is 
important to determine what specific factors are relevant for a person making a use-tax 
compliance decision.  Considering factors that are pertinent to federal income tax 
compliance might lead to suboptimal remedies since those factors may not be relevant to 
use-tax compliance decisions.  A richer discussion of differences between the federal 
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income and use taxes can be found below following identification of specific factors 
pertinent to the use-tax compliance decision. 
This study uses the approach developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) and Ajzen 
(1991) to build a model that explains use-tax compliance behavior.  This provides a 
method for not only determining what antecedents are important in forming one’s 
attitude, social norms, and perceived behavioral control, but also the relative importance 
of each.   
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III. Initial Survey 
Method 
I developed a survey utilizing the recommendations of Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) 
in order to determine antecedents of a person’s attitude towards paying a use tax (i.e., 
attitude towards compliance in Figure 1).  Ajzen and Fishbein refer to these antecedents 
as “salient beliefs” toward the action itself.  Accordingly, for the remainder of this study 
the term salient beliefs will be used.   
The survey consisted of four sections.11  The first section asked participants to list 
anything they knew about the use tax.  This was used to determine how much prior 
knowledge a participant had about the use tax.  The second section gave the participants 
relevant information on the use tax (e.g., definition and example of when the use tax 
would apply).  Anecdotal evidence indicates that many individuals know little or nothing 
about the use tax and asking them for their opinions on paying the use tax would yield 
few useful results without first providing background information to them.   
In the third section, participants received a scenario in which they were told to 
assume they had purchased an item online and therefore they owed a use tax.  
Participants were then asked to list “advantages, disadvantages, and anything else they 
associate” with paying the use tax on the purchase.  To be as consistent as possible with 
the recommendations of Ajzen and Fishbein (1980), participants were asked about paying 
a use tax on a particular purchase, not paying a use tax in general.  This is important since 
the theory of planned behavior deals with the attitude towards a specific action, not the 
                                                 
11 The research project received IRB approval from the University of South Florida before any data were 
collected. 
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subject of the action.  For example, although it might very well be important to determine 
one’s attitude towards the use tax in general, that is only one salient belief in determining 
one’s overall attitude towards paying the use tax on a specific purchase.  As mentioned 
previously, this type of questioning has been used in prior federal tax compliance 
research (e.g., Bobek and Hatfield 2003) to determine salient beliefs towards federal tax 
compliance attitudes.  The final section gathered demographic data on the participants.  A 
copy of the survey can be found in Appendix A. 
Participants 
The participants for this survey were undergraduate students from a large 
university located in the southeastern United States.  They were enrolled in an 
introductory accounting class at the time of data collection.  One hundred six individuals 
took part in the survey.  Demographic data for the participants can be found in Table 1. 
Given that the participants were undergraduate students, the demographic data are not 
surprising.  The majority of participants were young, unmarried, and in low income 
brackets.12   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 The average internet shopper tends be slightly older than an undergraduate student (Forsythe and Shi 
2003).   
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TABLE 1 – 
Demographic Data for Participants in the Survey 
  Number % of Total 
Gender     
Male 53 50.00% 
Female 53 50.00% 
Age     
Under 20 48 45.28% 
20 to 29 57 53.77% 
30 to 39 1 0.94% 
40 + 0 0.00% 
Household Income     
Zero to $20,000 54 50.94% 
$20,001 to $35,000 11 10.38% 
$35,001 to $50,000 5 4.72% 
$50,001 to $65,000 5 4.72% 
$65,001 to $80,000 5 4.72% 
$80,001 to $100,000 10 9.43% 
$100,000+ 16 15.09% 
Tax Return Status (2007 Return)     
Single 93 87.74% 
Married Filing Jointly 3 2.83% 
Married Filing Separately 0 0.00% 
Head of Household 4 3.77% 
Qualifying Widow(er) 0 0.00% 
Did Not File 6 5.66% 
              n = 106 
 
In addition to collecting general demographic data, the survey also asked 
participants questions relating to the use tax and the participant’s online buying habits.  
Table 2 summarizes this data. Only one of the 106 participants had any prior knowledge 
of the use tax before taking the survey.  The one participant who was aware of the use tax 
had this knowledge because her job required her to pay the use tax for the company 
where she worked.  Thirteen of the participants admitted they had no knowledge of the 
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use tax, but attempted to define it anyway.13  Ninety-two of the participants had never 
heard of the use tax.  In addition, 100 of the 106 participants had purchased a product 
online, with over half spending over $100 in the past year on online purchases. These 
data, while limited to a relatively homogeneous sample, indicate that the participants are 
representative of the typical online purchaser.  In addition, the data support the idea that 
states have done a poor job educating people about the use tax, a majority of people do 
not pay the use tax, and the states are losing a great deal of money due to this non-
compliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 In order to be counted in this group, a participant had to say, “I don’t know, but I will say.” or use similar 
wording. 
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TABLE 2 – 
Internet Buying Habits and Use Tax Data for Participants in the Survey 
 Number % of Total 
Awareness   
Did Not Know 92 86.79% 
Guessed Wrong 9 8.49% 
Guessed Correctly 4 3.77% 
Knew 1 0.94% 
Purchased Online Before   
Yes 100 94.34% 
No 6 5.66% 
Spent Online in Past Year   
Zero 6 5.66% 
$1 to $100 23 21.70% 
$101 to $500 50 47.17% 
$501 to $1,000 15 14.15% 
$1,001 to $5,000 12 11.32% 
$5,000 + 0 0.00% 
Paid Florida Use Tax Before   
Yes 3 2.83% 
No 57 53.77% 
Not Sure 46 43.40% 
Paid a Use Tax in any State Before  
Yes 3 2.83% 
No 60 56.60% 
Not Sure 43 40.57% 
                                                      n = 106 
Results 
The participants were asked to list any “advantages, disadvantages, or anything 
else they associated with” paying a use tax on a particular purchase.  The responses were 
then coded and tallied.14  A list of the more commonly given answers is shown in Table 
3.  The two most common responses for disadvantages and advantages were that 
complying with the use tax would require additional effort and that compliance would 
give the state more funding, respectively.  Interestingly, the second most common listed 
                                                 
14 Only one coder was used in this process.  Multiple coders were not used since there were no hypotheses 
being tested.  However, it is a potential limitation to the study. 
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advantage of paying the use tax was that the use tax was less than the sales tax.  This 
occurred since the county that a majority of students lived in has an additional one 
percent sales tax that is avoided by paying the use tax.  While it could be argued that this 
advantage would only be applicable to the cities and/or counties that have an additional 
sales tax, offering a lower use tax than the sales tax in the state might increase 
compliance just due to the fact that people feel better about saving even a small 
percentage then if they had to pay the sales tax in full.   
TABLE 3 – 
Most Commonly Listed Advantages and Disadvantages of Paying Use Tax 
 
 
The survey yielded 336 total identifiable responses.  This table lists the most commonly given advantages and disadvantages.  
* - Salient belief was included in the model 
** - Responses were combined to form the Fairness salient belief before being included in model 
***- Response were combined to form the Monetary Concerns salient belief before being included in the model
 Number of Times Listed 
Advantages  
Funding for state* 53 
Lower than sales tax in county*** 29 
Pay fair share** 15 
Might get caught if you don't pay 15 
Might incur penalty 13 
Obeying the law 7 
Moral Obligation 6 
Disadvantages  
Effort* 58 
Monetary payment*** 37 
Another tax* 23 
Knowledge* 23 
Majority of people would not pay 20 
Tax is not fair** 16 
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IV. Developing and Testing the Model 
Developing a Use-Tax Compliance Model 
A model of use tax compliance was built using the data obtained from the 
survey. The first step is choosing the salient beliefs identified in the survey to put in 
the model.  Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) suggest using enough beliefs so that 75 
percent of all responses are represented in the model.  The survey yielded 336 
separate responses; accordingly responses were ranked and added to the model until 
the model contained at least 252 responses (or 75 percent of all responses).   
During this step certain advantages and disadvantages that involved the same 
underlying concept were combined to form one salient belief.  For example, 
participants listed paying their fair share of taxes as an advantage and the tax not 
being fair as a disadvantage.  Since both of these responses concerned fairness they 
were combined into one salient belief (termed Fairness).  An identical approach was 
taken with the disadvantage of monetary payments and the above mentioned 
advantage that the use tax owed on the purchase was less than the sales tax that would 
have been due for the participants in the county where the initial survey was 
administered.  This salient belief was termed Monetary Concerns.   
As mentioned above, salient beliefs were then added to the model until at least 
75% of all responses were included.  For example, monetary concerns was the most 
often listed salient belief (60, approximately 20 % of the total number of responses 
given).  The second most often listed salient belief was effort; this salient belief was 
listed 58 times (or approximately 17 percent of the total number of responses given).  
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Combining these two totals yields 37 percent of the total number of all responses.  
The next salient belief added was funding to the state (53, equaling approximately 
16% of the total number of responses given).  Adding this salient belief meant the 
model now included 53% of all responses.  Accordingly, the salient beliefs of 
fairness, another tax, and knowledge were added to the model so that 75% of all 
responses were included.  Salient beliefs highlighted with an asterisk in Table 3 were 
included in the model.  The full model is shown in Figure 2. 
FIGURE 2 –  
Model of Use Tax Compliance using the Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effort (-) 
Funding for 
State (+) 
Monetary 
Concerns (-) 
Knowledge (+) 
Attitude towards 
compliance (+) 
Intention (+) Behavior 
Social Norms (+) 
Co-workers 
Friends 
Perceived Likelihood of 
Detection (+)  
Fairness (+) 
Another Tax (-) 
Friends 
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Salient Beliefs Determined in the Survey 
Attitude 
General attitude towards an action refers to a person’s feelings toward 
performing the stated action.  Having a positive (negative) attitude towards the stated 
action increases (decreases) the likelihood that the person will perform the stated 
action.  The next section discusses the salient beliefs determined in the survey that 
should influence attitude. 
Effort 
One area of taxpayer compliance of singular relevance to the use-tax question 
comes from the compliance requirements themselves.  For purposes of this paper, I 
specifically define effort as the compliance requirements imposed on the taxpayer to 
pay the use tax.  Most states require the individual to include the use-tax owed on 
their state income tax return (e.g. Alabama, New York).  In Florida, there is no 
income tax, thus there is no accompanying income tax form to complete.  In general, 
for states that do not have an income tax, the individual must find the appropriate 
form online, complete it, and submit it to the appropriate taxing authority.  In each 
case, the burden is on the taxpayer to maintain adequate records to ensure 
compliance.  Keeping track of all purchases is also the responsibility of the 
individual.  Unlike the federal income tax, where forms are given to the individual 
(e.g., W-2s, 1099s, etc.), the burden of maintaining records is completely on the 
individual.  This could lead the individual to have a more negative “attitude” towards 
compliance. 
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Fifty-eight participants listed some form of “effort” as a disadvantage to 
paying the use tax.  To date, little tax research has actually examined the requirements 
to comply with a tax.  This is probably due to the fact that most analyses focus on the 
federal income tax, which, in its present form, presents minimal confusion on how to 
actually comply with that tax (i.e., fill out a form and submit it to the IRS).  Prior 
research has tended to focus mainly on the complexity of tax laws (Kaplow 1998; 
Krause 2000).  Kaplow (1998) developed a framework discussing how accurate a tax 
return should be and if, and why, a taxpayer seeks outside advice when preparing a 
tax return.  Krause (2000) argued that income tax laws are so complex that the IRS 
cannot always determine the “true” liability owed.  The results of most of this 
research are not overly surprising:  as complexity increases, compliance decreases.  In 
their literature review, Alm and McKee (1998) indicate that “burden of compliance” 
indeed might be a factor in tax compliance behavior.  The discussion of prior research 
linked to burden of compliance in Alm and McKee (1998), however, focused more on 
complexity and uncertainty. 
Tax research has also focused on other issues that might make tax compliance 
less complex.  For example, Masselli et al. (2002) examined how the use of tax 
preparation software influenced compliance.  The results of Masselli et al. (2002) 
indicate that less-experienced taxpayers tend to ‘overreact’ to embedded audit 
warnings in these programs and increase the amount of income reported.  A second 
way in which taxpayers reduce complexity is by using paid tax preparers to prepare 
tax returns.  Research has examined how the use of tax preparers influences 
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compliance (Hite and McGill 1992; Christian et al. 1994).  The results of these 
studies have generally shown that the use of tax preparers generally reduces a 
person’s tax liability (Christian et al. 1994).  Research has not established that this 
reduction in tax liability is the primary reason for using preparers, however.  In fact, 
some evidence suggests that taxpayers do not always prefer aggressive advice, but 
rather that the return be accurate (Hite and McGill 1992).  Taken together, this 
research suggests that people try to reduce complexity by a number of means.   
There are few ways that a taxpayer could reduce the complexity and/or 
compliance requirements of the use tax, however.  No tax software exists that the 
general population could use for complying with the use tax, and tax preparers offer 
little in the way of services to help.   Thus, the use tax provides an interesting setting 
as the burden to comply currently rests with the taxpayer as compared to the sales tax 
where the tax is collected by the vendor. Under current regulations, an online vendor 
website is not required to provide any information about the responsibility for the use 
tax to the individual nor does it provide any information to the state if the vendor sells 
an item and sales tax is not collected.  The burden thus lies with the taxpayer, who 
must find all applicable forms, print them, fill out, and submit the forms to the state.  
One may posit that this level of effort reduces compliance, and some interesting 
questions emerge: how much assistance (if any) does a taxpayer require in order to 
comply with use-tax laws?  Would taxpayers prefer a system where the website 
automatically fills out the appropriate form for them?  This area offers many avenues 
of investigation for future use-tax research. 
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In summary, there is little prior empirical research related to effort (i.e., 
compliance requirements imposed on a taxpayer).  Research addressing complexity 
has shown that as a tax law becomes more complex, however, compliance with the 
tax law decreases.  Based on the above discussion, I propose the following 
hypothesis: 
H1a: The salient belief Effort will be negatively correlated with the Attitude 
variable. 
 
Funding for State 
 
The advantage most often listed in the salient belief identification survey was 
the idea that paying the use tax leads to more funding for the state.  Interestingly, little 
tax research has examined this rather obvious point.  Alm, Jackson, and McKee 
(1992) find that the level of popular support for a public good affects the level of 
compliance. Falsetta et al. (2008) offer experimental evidence that taxpayers are more 
likely to comply with income tax laws when they support the government program 
with which the tax is associated.  
No research has examined how the individual feels about paying a tax towards 
their state versus the federal government. Based on the above discussion, I propose 
the following hypothesis: 
H1b: The salient belief Funding for State will be positively correlated with the 
Attitude variable. 
 
Monetary Concerns 
Monetary concerns as defined in this study refer to the fact that taxpayers will 
have less money if they pay the use tax.  This point generally provides the tension in 
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most tax compliance research.  The seminal study of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) 
is widely recognized as providing the foundation for modern tax compliance research.  
In this study, the authors developed a model for explaining taxpayer behavior.  This 
model is based on the notion that given a tax, penalty, and detection rate, individuals 
will choose a compliance level to maximize monetary utility.  In my survey, 37 
participants listed monetary concerns as a disadvantage to paying the use tax and 
saving money over paying full sales tax in county as an advantage.   
Empirical research has also found that the predictions of this model hold in a 
compliance setting.  Both Beck et al. (1991) and Carnes and Englebrecht (1995) 
confirm that increasing either penalty or audit rate led to an increase in compliance.15  
Cuccia (1994) refers to this line of study, which assumes that individuals will act to 
maximize utility, as economics-based compliance research and provides a 
comprehensive literature review on the topic.  It should be noted that in all of these 
studies, individuals maximize their utility based on maximizing their monetary return. 
With regards to this current study, taxpayers could be making a use-tax compliance 
decision based on maximizing monetary utility. 
These prior results could be of particular importance when examining use-tax 
compliance for a number of reasons.  First, there is little chance of an individual 
being caught in noncompliance of a use tax due to the low audit rate.  Second, if an 
individual were to be audited, the use tax would only apply if that individual used, 
stored, or consumed the taxable item in the state.  If the item could conceivably be 
shown to have been purchased as a gift, the individual would not owe the use tax.  
                                                 
15 In both of these studies the term “audit rate” is analogous to “detection rate.”   
30 
 
Hence, there is little chance that a state could ever prove that the individual is subject 
to the use tax since the individual could always claim the item is elsewhere.  Third, 
since there is minimal chance of being caught, there is consequently minimal chance 
that a person would ever incur a penalty by non-compliance.  Fourth, as mentioned in 
the list of potential differences between the federal income and use tax earlier, the 
use-tax is a cash outlay.  due to the withholding of federal tax, individuals federal 
income tax liability is never paid as a lump sum amount when the tax return is due, 
whereas the use tax represents an explicit cash outlay for every transaction. 
(Schepanski and Shearer 1995).   
Based on the Allingham and Sadmo (1972) model and the fact that a person 
will have a minimal chance of being caught or incur a penalty for non-compliance, a 
person will always be monetarily better off not paying the use tax.  Based on the 
above discussion, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1c: The salient belief Monetary Concerns will be negatively correlated with 
the Attitude variable. 
 
Fairness 
 
The term fairness relates to the justification and validity a consumer assigns to 
the imposition of a given tax.16  Fifteen participants listed “pay fair share” as an 
advantage of paying the use tax, while 16 listed “tax is not fair” as a disadvantage.  
The earlier list of potential differences described the fact that the use tax was a 
consumption based tax whereas the federal income tax is income-based.  People 
                                                 
16 A more accurate term would be “perceived fairness” since fairness implies that a tax is fair or unfair 
when in reality each person makes this decision.  However, to be consistent with prior literature, the 
term fairness is used. 
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could perceive one type of tax as more or less fair than the other.  Given that people 
could find one tax more or less fair than the other, compliance decisions between the 
taxes could differ. 
Generally, equity theory is employed when investigating tax fairness (Moser 
et al. 1995; Maroney et al. 2002).  It is generally assumed in these studies that an 
individual is more likely to pay a tax if he or she perceives the tax as equitable.  For 
example, if a taxpayer believes his or her tax liability is the correct/fair amount, then 
he or she is more likely to pay the tax.  In addition, equity theory states that if a 
discrepancy emerges between the amount due and the amount paid, this discrepancy 
can be attributed to the concept of fairness. Thus, a taxpayer who believes he or she 
owes too much is less likely to pay the full amount owed because he or she does not 
find the tax fair (Moser et al. 1995).  
While the link between fairness and compliance is a significant and valuable 
research stream, other research has attempted to understand what aspects of the tax 
itself cause an individual to find it unfair.  Jackson and Milliron (1985) identified two 
dimensions associated with the perception of fairness with regard to the tax:  the 
equity of trade (commonly referred to as exchange equity) and a taxpayer’s burden 
relative to others (vertical and horizontal equity).  Exchange equity, as defined by 
Jackson and Milliron (1985), refers to the difference between the amount of tax a 
person pays and to the benefits he or she receives from the tax.  If a person feels he or 
she pays too high of an amount relative to the benefits he or she receives, a person 
will find the tax unfair.   
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There are two forms of inequity that have been shown to address a taxpayer’s 
burden relative to others: horizontal and vertical inequity.  Horizontal inequity occurs 
when one individual pays a higher amount in taxes than another despite both 
individuals being classified in the same income bracket.  For example, two single 
factory workers with the same compensation package should, according to horizontal 
equity theory, be paying roughly the same in taxes.  Vertical inequity, in turn, 
suggests that people who make more money should consequently pay more in taxes.  
For example, if an extremely wealthy person such as Bill Gates is paying a smaller 
percentage of his income in tax than a middle-class individual, the tax more likely 
would be considered an unfair tax burden on the less affluent payer.  An additional 
empirical example linking the types of inequities with taxpayer behavior is provided 
by Moser et al. (1995). In this study, the authors examine how horizontal and 
exchange inequity each affect tax reporting decisions.  The authors predict that 
taxpayers will report less income when tax rates and horizontal inequity increase. Just 
increasing the tax rate itself does not decrease compliance.  This can be attributed to 
the fact that individuals will find horizontal inequity unfair and report less income, 
but will be less likely to find exchange inequity unfair given the universality of the 
tax increase.  This study thus provides evidence that not all forms of inequity are 
perceived as uniformly unfair by the taxpayer, but instead the perception of fairness 
does play a part in a taxpayer’s reporting decision.  For instance, an individual may 
believe there is no benefit to himself/herself in paying the use tax (exchange 
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inequity), yet is still likely to pay the tax in recognition of the universal burden of the 
tax (vertical/horizontal inequity). 
Maroney et al. (2002) introduced the concept of vertical inequity in addition 
to the horizontal and exchange equity dimensions of their study.  Their study explored 
the provision of different explanations based on these dimensions and its effect on 
taxpayer compliance.  The tax used in the study was the social security tax, with 
participants given an explanation as to why their social security benefits were being 
taxed.  The parameters of the horizontal equity explanation as defined by the study 
stated (page 83): 
Congress decided to tax social security income for some tax payers 
in an effort to enhance tax equity.  Congress believes that social 
security benefits are intended to replace lost wages, which is very 
similar to other forms of retirement income (for example, a 
pension from an employer).  Since these other forms of retirement 
income are subject to tax, Congress believes that a portion of 
social security benefits should also be subject to tax. 
 
The results indicate that there is not one universal type of explanation that 
allows for generalizations of all taxpayers in all situations.  Specifically, for a subject 
who is already being taxed on social security, the exchange equity explanation leads 
to greater levels of acceptance and higher degrees of perceived fairness.17  For 
subjects not already paying a tax on their social security, the higher level of 
acceptance is consistent with the vertical exchange explanation.  It is important to 
note, however, that the ethical exchange explanation did not actually lead to higher 
levels of perceived fairness for those not currently paying taxes on their social 
security benefits. 
                                                 
17 The participants in Maroney et al. (2002) were senior citizens.   
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In summary, there is a growing body of evidence to suggest that exchange, 
vertical, and horizontal inequity all are negatively related to tax compliance behavior.  
Based on the above discussion, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1d: The salient belief Fairness will be positively correlated with the Attitude 
variable. 
 
Knowledge 
Knowledge, as defined for this study, is the information required by the 
taxpayer to comply with use-tax laws.  Knowledge is a potentially significant factor 
that has to date received little attention in tax compliance research.  The lack of 
attention to knowledge as a factor can probably be attributed to the fact that most 
people are well aware of the federal income tax and know how to comply with it.  
The concept of knowledge of a tax could be of particular value to use-tax compliance 
research, however, given the variations in use-tax laws, forms, and compliance 
requirements from state to state.  The concept of knowledge of use tax is especially 
important in this study, considering how few people knew of the use tax before the 
survey.  Greater knowledge of use tax might help individuals understand not only 
how to comply, but also why the use tax exists.  Twenty-three participants listed lack 
of knowledge as a reason for not paying the use tax.18   
Creating knowledge is, above all, a form of education, and numerous 
empirical studies have examined the influence of education on taxpayer compliance 
(Kasipillai et al. 2003; Witte and Woodbury 1983).  The results are mixed; Kasipillai 
                                                 
18 Examples of knowledge beliefs include the participant indicating that they would be afraid they 
would incorrectly fill out the form, not know what online purchases require payment of the use tax, not 
knowing where to obtain the correct forms, etc. 
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et al. (2003) finds that more education leads to an increase in compliance of 
undergraduate students in Malaysia.  Witte and Woodbury (1985), however, find the 
opposite, noting that more education could instead lead to an increase in 
noncompliant behavior.  The authors suggest that this could be attributed to the fact 
that, for some individuals, more advanced levels of education actually suggest new 
avenues for avoiding compliance.  This suggests an inverted-U relationship between 
knowledge and compliance.  When knowledge is low, increases in knowledge will 
improve compliance.  When knowledge reaches a certain point, however, compliance 
is maximized and any more information given to the taxpayer could provide 
opportunities to lower compliance.  In this current study, I assume the participants 
will be on the left-hand side of the inverted-U since knowledge of the use tax is low. 
The problem of increases in internet purchases provides a unique opportunity 
to improve knowledge and potentially to improve compliance.  Knowledge 
conveyance could occur simply by installing a pop-up window at checkout informing 
the customer of the use tax due on the purchase.  Interestingly, the creation of 
knowledge could interact with the effort salient belief.  Prior tax research has revealed 
an interaction between complexity and knowledge (O’Donnell et al. 2005).  
Specifically, as the complexity of a tax decision increases, tax professionals with 
higher procedural knowledge tend to favor less aggressive tax positions.  Procedural 
knowledge deals with the type of knowledge that is needed to complete a specific 
task.  In terms of this study, I posit that giving a person the knowledge as to what the 
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use tax is and how to comply with it will increase compliance through reducing the 
perceived effort of compliance. 
The question emerges as to how the message can be most effectively and 
efficiently conveyed when attempting to create awareness.  Sanders et al. (2008) 
found that sending construction firms a letter detailing penalties associated with non-
compliance did increase use-tax compliance.  Based on the above discussion, I 
propose the following hypothesis: 
H1e: The salient belief Knowledge will be positively correlated with the 
Attitude variable. 
 
Another Tax 
Participants listed as a disadvantage to paying the use tax that the tax itself is 
just “another tax” that must be paid.  It could be argued that this salient belief is 
similar in scope to the monetary concern or fairness salient beliefs.  Since numerous 
participants listed it as a separate disadvantage over having to pay a tax, it was left as 
its own salient belief.19   
No empirical research has addressed how adding a new tax to taxes already 
being paid by people affects their beliefs or actions towards the new tax.  The current 
study does not seek to explore to explore the psychological phenomena underlying 
the cause of Another Tax being a significant variable.  Future research, however, 
could investigate the specific psychological factors induced when individuals are 
presented with a new tax.   
                                                 
19 Bobek and Hatfield (2003) took a similar approach to a salient belief in their paper.  The authors 
identified “engaging in illegal” behavior as a separate salient belief over incurring a penalty or 
potentially being audited. 
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Lack of prior research makes predicting how this salient belief will influence 
attitude towards paying the use tax difficult.  It seems intuitive, however, that since 
numerous individuals listed it as a disadvantage that paying another tax should be 
negatively correlated with attitude.  Based on the above discussion, I propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1f: The salient belief Another Tax will be negatively correlated with the 
Attitude variable. 
 
Social Norms 
A potentially critical factor in a person’s decision to comply with the use tax 
is the influence of social norms in general.  Twenty participants listed the fact that 
other people do not pay as a disadvantage of complying with the use tax.  Alm and 
McKee (1998) list social norms a main factor in tax compliance behavior.  This 
section highlights several of the theories that help to explain how and/or why social 
norms may affect an individual’s use-tax compliance choice and tax-compliance 
research that has examined social factors and their influence on tax compliance 
decisions.   
Social comparison theory (Festinger 1954) states that an individual seeks to 
compare him/herself to others to determine how he/she is doing.  For example, a 
person may be more inclined to laugh if others around him/her are laughing.  
Festinger (1954) argues that this effect is more pronounced under conditions of 
uncertainty.   
Social identity theory is similar in scope to social comparison theory, but 
provides richer detail as to which specific social groups a person would compare 
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him/herself too.   Social identity theory states that a person will classify themselves in 
groups/categories.  The group(s) that a person most closely identifies themselves with 
will become ingroups and a person will base actions and decisions to conform to the 
ingroup norms (Ashforth and Mael 1989). 
Social theories have been employed in explaining taxpayer compliance 
decisions. King and Sheffrin (2002), for instance, examine prior research and suggest 
that social comparisons influences tax-paying behavior.  For example, if a person 
finds his or her friends are complying with a tax, he or she is more likely to comply.  
It is important to note, however, that King and Sheffrin’s article was not an empirical 
study addressing social comparison theory directly.   
Stalans et al. (1991) examine the roles co-workers and family/friends play 
when an individual forms his or her beliefs about IRS enforcement activities and the 
acceptability of noncompliance on tax returns. The authors predicted that individuals 
would use work colleagues to obtain information about IRS enforcement activities 
given the fact that tax burdens are more likely to be similar among co-workers. 
Further, the study predicted that co-workers and family members assume differing 
roles for the individual when it comes to tax compliance decisions. Specifically, 
communications from family members are concerned with normative issues (e.g., 
right versus wrong) and the fairness of tax laws. Communications from co-workers 
are more likely to be concerned with opportunities or techniques to avoid detection 
when not complying with tax laws. Communication with co-workers would then 
decrease judgments of the appropriateness of tax compliance, the fairness of tax laws, 
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the likelihood of formal detection for overstating deductions, and the severity of 
informal sanctions if caught by authorities. 
Stalans et al. (1991) utilized data from phone interviews with adult Minnesota 
residents conducted by the Minnesota Center for Social Research.  The results 
indicate that communication with co-workers lowered the perceived likelihood of 
detection of overstated deductions, lowered the perceived severity of punishment if 
caught, and lowered the perceived fairness of tax laws and positive personal norms 
toward compliance with tax laws. Further, as the study predicted, communication 
with family members increased the perceived fairness of tax laws and positive 
personal norms towards compliance with tax laws.  An important limitation of the 
study, however, is that the authors fail to link these “new” feelings with actual 
compliance behavior.  The TPB provides the necessary link between these findings 
and actual compliance, however.  Based on the above discussion, I include family, 
friends, and co-workers as three factors to control for social norms. 
Perceived Behavioral Control 
As discussed previously, perceived behavioral control deals with the amount 
of control a person believes he has over a certain action (Ajzen 1991).  This is not the 
same as actual control over an outcome.  For example, suppose a forty-five year old 
man wanted to learn to play basketball well enough to play in the NBA.  Even though 
the actual odds of a professional basketball team giving him a tryout would be 
remote, he might still try if he perceives that he can, in fact, make the NBA.  In this 
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study, to be consistent with Bobek and Hatfield (2003), perceived likelihood of 
detection will be used to proxy for perceived behavioral control.20 
Overall Model 
As discussed, according to the TPB attitude, perceived behavioral control and 
social norms should be positively related to one’s intention to comply with the use 
tax.  Stated in hypothesis form: 
H2: The attitude, social norm, and perceived behavioral control constructs 
will be positively correlated with an individual’s intention to pay the use 
tax.21 
 
Differences from Federal Income Tax 
As discussed previously, Bobek and Hatfield (2003) used a similar procedure 
to develop a model of federal tax compliance.  Only one salient belief is common 
between the two studies – fairness.  A second salient belief identified in this study--
monetary utility--is similar in scope to Bobek and Hatfield’s “minimize taxes paid.”  
The three other salient beliefs identified in Bobek and Hatfield (2003) were guilt 
feelings associated with non-compliance, breaking the law, and incurring a penalty.  
It is important to note that all three of these variables were listed by participants in 
this study (see Table 2).  However, they were not included in the current model since 
they were not within the 75% range cutoff for inclusion.  Taken together, these results 
                                                 
20 Bobek and Hatfield (2003) actually use the audit rate multiplied by the likelihood the IRS would 
discover the non-compliance if audited.  In this current setting audit and discovery would occur 
simultaneously, so only one question will be asked. 
21 Intuitively perceived likelihood of detection should be negatively correlated with perceived 
behavioral control (i.e., the higher the perceived likelihood of detection, the less “control” one actually 
has over a situation).  A tax compliance setting is actually somewhat unique setting for the TPB since 
increasing compliance should involve taking away control. 
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indicate that although people have similar salient beliefs when paying the federal 
income tax and the use tax, the beliefs are not identical.   
Method 
To test the model, questions were developed similar to other studies that use 
the TPB to test a salient beliefs model (Taylor and Todd 1994; Taylor and Todd 1995, 
Bobek and Hatfield 2003; Bobek et al 2007).  This process involves asking 
participants about individual beliefs and the relative importance of these feelings with 
regard to each construct.  For example, the survey determined that an important 
salient belief affecting attitude towards paying the use tax was the effort of complying 
with use tax.  Participants were asked how much they agree with the following 
statement pertaining to effort, “paying the use tax on this purchase would be time 
consuming” on a 7-point likert type scale.  The relative importance of this factor was 
determined by asking participants how much they agree with the following statement 
on a 7-point scale, “The amount of time it would take to pay the use tax on this 
purchase was very unimportant/very important to me when making my compliance 
decision.”  The “effort” score then was determined by multiplying the two questions 
together.22   
The antecedents for social norms ask participants about different “groups” of 
people that would influence their decision:  family, co-workers, and general 
population.  For example, a participant was asked how much they agree with the 
statement, “my co-workers would want me to pay the use tax on this purchase.”  
                                                 
22 Some salient beliefs had more that one set of questions asked.  This was to ensure that the instrument 
captured multiple dimensions of the construct.  For example, the effort score had four questions.  The 
full survey can be found in the Appendix. 
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Similar to the attitude antecedents, these scores were weighted against the relative 
importance that the co-workers would want the individual to pay the use tax.   
The perceived behavioral control question asked participants to indicate how 
likely it was that Florida would discover this purchase on a 7-point scale.  The overall 
attitude score asked participants to indicate on a 7-point scale how much they agreed 
with the statement, “I have a positive attitude towards paying the use tax.”  Finally, 
the behavioral intention was derived by asking the participant how likely is it they 
will pay the use tax on the purchase in the scenario (0 to 100 percent).   
Participants 
Seventy-three undergraduate and graduate students from accounting classes 
were used.  Demographic data for the participants can be found in Table 4. 
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TABLE 4 – 
Demographic Data for Participants in the Model Validation Step 
 Number % of Total 
Gender   
Male 44 60.27% 
Female 29 39.73% 
Age   
Under 20 7 9.59% 
20 to 29 43 58.90% 
30 to 39 17 23.29% 
40 + 6 8.22% 
Household Income   
Zero to $20,000 25 34.25% 
$20,001 to $35,000 13 17.81% 
$35,001 to $50,000 11 15.07% 
$50,001 to $65,000 5 6.85% 
$65,001 to $80,000 4 5.48% 
$80,001 to $100,000 2 2.74% 
$100,000+ 13 17.81% 
Tax Return Status (2007 Return)   
Single 49 67.12% 
Married Filing Jointly 15 20.55% 
Married Filing Separately 1 1.37% 
Head of Household 4 5.48% 
Qualifying Widow(er) 1 1.37% 
Did Not File 3 4.11% 
           n = 73 
 
The participants are slightly older and have higher household income than the 
participants from the initial survey.  This is not surprising since some these 
participants were graduate students, whereas the participants in the initial survey were 
all undergraduate students.  As mentioned above, the average internet shopper tends 
be slightly older than an undergraduate student (Forsythe and Shi 2003).  Thus, these 
subjects are even more reflective of a typical internet consumer than those 
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participants used in the initial survey.  Table 5 shows data regarding participants’ 
internet shopping habits.  Like the participants in the initial survey, a majority of the 
participants have purchased online while only a few have ever paid the use tax.  
Unlike the survey, participants were not asked to list everything they know about the 
use tax.  Instead, a self-reported use-tax knowledge question was asked (7-point 
scale).  The results show that the participants tended to feel they had a fair amount of 
use-tax knowledge (over 50% responded on the mid-point or greater).  This result is 
probably attributed to the fact that all but two of participants had taken a tax course in 
the past where the use tax was discussed.23 
                                                 
23 The university that these graduate students are attending does spend some time discussing the use 
tax in various tax courses.  However, some of the graduate students may have attended other 
institutions for their undergraduate degrees where the use tax was not discussed. 
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TABLE 5 – 
Internet Buying Habits and Use Tax Data for Participants in the Model Validation Step 
 Number % of Total 
Awareness (Self-Reported, 1 to 7 scale)   
1 (No Knowledge) 10 13.70% 
2 4 5.48% 
3 1 1.37% 
4 5 6.85% 
5 14 19.18% 
6 4 5.48% 
7 (High Knowledge) 5 6.85% 
Purchased Online Before   
Yes 71 97.26% 
No 2 2.74% 
Spent Online in Past Year   
Zero 2 2.74% 
$1 to $100 7 9.59% 
$101 to $500 32 43.84% 
$501 to $1,000 17 23.29% 
$1,001 to $5,000 11 15.07% 
$5,000 + 2 2.74% 
Paid Florida Use Tax Before   
Yes* 7 9.59% 
No 36 49.32% 
Not Sure 30 41.10% 
Paid a Use Tax in any State Before   
Yes 9 12.33% 
No 34 46.58% 
Not Sure 30 41.10% 
                                            n = 73 
* To ensure that participants actually had paid the use tax, a follow-up question was used asking whether or not the participant 
had filled out and submitted form DR-15MO.  None of the 7 who indicated they had paid the use tax in the past had filled out 
this form.  Although not conclusive, this indicates that the participant did not actually pay a use tax to Florida (since the only 
way the use tax can be paid in Florida is through submission of the form DR-15MO).   
 
Procedure 
Subjects were given the same scenario and description of the use tax used in 
the survey.  They then were asked how likely they would be to pay the use tax on the 
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purchase discussed in the scenario.  After answering that question, the salient belief, 
attitude, social norm, and perceived behavioral control questions discussed above 
were asked.  Finally, demographic data were obtained.   
Results 
Before analyzing results, factor analysis was performed.24  The main results of 
the factor analysis are shown in Table 6.  The questions relating to the three variables 
linked to social norms (family, co-workers, and friends) loaded to form one variable.  
In addition, the questions relating to the salient belief Effort, Another Tax, and 
Funding for State  loaded correctly as well (i.e., the four questions relating to Effort 
loaded to form one factor, two questions relating to Another Tax formed one factor, 
etc).  For the analysis, I used these factor load scores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 Factor loading was conducted based on the suggestions in Fields (2005).   
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TABLE 6 – 
Factor Loading and Cronbach’s Alpha for Factors with Multiple Questions 
  Factor Cronbach's 
    Load Alpha 
Salient Beliefs 
Effort   0.918 
Hassle  0.884   
Require effort  0.895   
Inconvenient  0.929   
Time consuming   0.874   
Funding for State   0.913 
Give Florida more money  0.959   
Florida would benefit  0.959   
Another Tax     0.785 
Another tax in a multitude of taxes  0.912   
Another way government is trying to get my money   0.912   
        
Variables Directly Linked to Intention 
Social Norms   0.948 
Family  .795  
Friends  .770  
Co-Workers  .842  
 
 
Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in TABLE 7. 
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TABLE 7 – 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Model Validation Step 
Construct Mean (Std. Dev) 
Likelihood to pay (DV) 21.51 (31.79) 
  
Variables Directly Linked to Compliance 
Attitude 3.29 (1.44) 
Social Norms 20.72 (13.68) 
Perceived Behavioral Control 2.62 (1.59) 
  
Salient Beliefs 
Effort 95.06 (39.29) 
Funding for State 33.59 (19.79) 
Monetary Concerns 21.33 (13.59) 
Knowledge 17.22 (8.61) 
Fairness 14.70 (8.63) 
Another Tax 42.61 (21.81) 
Likelihood to pay asked participants how likely they would be to pay the use tax on a 0 to 100 percent scale.   
Attitude ranged from 1 to 7 
Social Norms used the factor load scores from TABLE 6 (range 2.41 to 54.74) 
Perceived Behavioral Control ranged from 1 to 7 
Effort used the factor load scores from TABLE 6 (range 14.26 to 175.52) 
Funding for State used the factor load scores from TABLE 6 (range 6.71 to 80.56) 
Monetary Concerns ranged from 1 to 49 
Knowledge ranged from 1 to 36 
Fairness ranged from 2 to 42 
Funding for State used the factor load scores from TABLE 6 (range 6.71 to 80.56) 
 
The likelihood to pay measure had a mean of 21.51% with a standard 
deviation of 31.79.  Next the hypotheses were tested using simply linear regression 
techniques.  To test Hypotheses H1a through H1f, the following model was used: 
Attitude = α0 + β1Effort + β 2Funding For State + β3Monetary Concerns + β 
4Knowledge + β5Fairness + β 6Another Tax + ε 
 
To test H2, the following model was used: 
 
Likelihood = α0 + β1Attitude + β2Social Norms + β3PBC + ε 
 
All results can be found in Table 8.   
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TABLE 8 – 
Models from Pilot Study 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P-Value (1-tail) 
Likelihood = α0 + β1Attitude + β 2Social Norms + β3PBC +  ε 
Constant -19.049 9.179 .021 
Attitude 3.448 2.55 .091 
Social Norms .400 .248 .055 
PBC 7.997 2.225 <.001 
R2 = 27.7%    
Adjusted R2 = 24.6%    
    
Attitude = α0 + β1Effort + β 2Funding For State + β3Monetary Concerns + β 4Knowledge + β5Fairness + β 6Another Tax + ε 
Constant 3.708 .530 <.001 
Effort -.011 .004 .003 
Funding for State .015 .009 .048 
Monetary Concerns .001 0.011 .47 
Knowledge .009 .017 .30 
Fairness .045 .020 .018 
Another Tax -.019 .008 .013 
R2 = 39.8%    
Adjusted R2 = 34.3%    
 
The results regarding the effects of the salient beliefs on attitude towards 
compliance are encouraging.  Four of the six beliefs are significant at the .05 level 
(Effort, Funding for State, Another Tax, and Fairness).25 The two salient beliefs that 
were not significantly related to attitude were Monetary Concerns (p-value = .47) and 
Knowledge (p-value = .30).  The insignificant results for the Monetary Concern 
variable could be attributed to the fact that the use-tax owed in this case was 
relatively small ($12.00).  Future research could investigate at what point this variable 
does become significant (i.e., how much tax is owed before people start caring about 
                                                 
25 All p-values are one-tail unless otherwise mentioned.   
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the effect on their finances paying would have).  The Knowledge variable will be 
discussed in greater detail in the remedy section. 
The overall attitude score, factor load score for social norms, and perceived 
likelihood of detection (i.e., the proxy used for PBC) were all significantly correlated 
in the predicted direction with intention to comply.  This result supports the idea that 
TPB is a valid framework for explaining a person’s intention to comply with the use 
tax.  A summary of the hypotheses and their results can be found in Table 9. 
TABLE 9 – 
Summary of Hypotheses Testing for Model Testing 
Hypothesis P-Value (1-tailed) Support/Fail 
H1a - Effort .003 Support 
H1b - Funding for State .048 Support 
H1c - Monetary Concerns .47 Fail 
H1d - Fairness .018 Support 
H1e - Knowledge .30 Fail 
H1f - Another Tax .013 Support 
H2 - Model N/A Support 
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V.  Remedies for Improving Use-Tax Compliance 
The final part of this study develops two remedies that could help states 
improve use-tax compliance.  Although there are numerous potential remedies, I first 
develop remedies based on whether it addresses factors determined in the survey, 
could be easily implemented by both the state and the Internet vendor on the website, 
and do not involve the website automatically collecting the use tax.  This last 
requirement is important since Quill Inc. vs. North Dakota determined that vendors 
did not have to collect a sales tax for a state unless they had nexus in that state. 
The first specific remedy chosen was one developed to address the Effort 
salient belief.  This remedy was chosen since it met the criteria listed above, was the 
most frequently listed disadvantage in the survey, and an easy to implement solution 
for this remedy already exists (as explained below). 
Remedy – Effort 
The effort remedy examined is a situation where the online vendor asks the 
customer if they would like the use-tax and payment to the appropriate state to be 
automatically collected by the vendor at the time of purchase.  The technology for 
this remedy already exists due to the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
(SSUTA) discussed previously.  This agreement allows companies to use computer 
programs (called “certified service providers”) to calculate the amount of tax to be 
collected from each customer, and to determine the state to which the tax should be 
paid.  The company then collects the use tax owed from the customer and submits it 
to the proper state.  The SSUTA is a voluntary program and a business does not have 
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to comply.  Under the current remedy proposed in this study, the website would not 
be forced to collect the use tax, but rather simply gives the customer the option of 
having the website collect the use tax due on behalf of the customer.  If the customer 
wishes to pay, the vendor would collect the money and submit it to the proper state 
based on the shipping address of the customer.  This remedy would thus remove 
almost all effort (and/or complexity) required for compliance.  A customer would just 
pay an additional amount (i.e., the use tax) on the online purchase.  Based on this, I 
predict the following hypothesis: 
H3:  When given the effort remedy, participants’ intention to comply 
with the use tax will be higher than when not given the remedy. 
 
Remedy - Information 
As discussed above, the participants in the initial survey and pilot test were 
given a brief description of the use tax prior to reading the scenario.  This use tax 
information was provided since anecdotal evidence indicates that many individuals 
know little or nothing about the use tax.  Without providing some minimal knowledge 
of the use tax to participants, antecedents to use tax compliance could not fully be 
examined in the model-testing phase of this study. However, providing participants 
this information did not allow an examination of whether the information itself may 
improve compliance intentions. 
In this final step of the study, an information manipulation is included for two 
reasons.26  First, it provides me with a control sample.  In the absence of the remedy, 
having a condition with no information allows me to measure what the use-tax 
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compliance rate currently would be for a representative sample of the current real 
world population.  In the presence of the remedy, having a condition with no 
information allows me to measure what the use-tax compliance rate would be for 
individuals if they only saw the remedy.  In other words, it would reveal what would 
happen if a state chose to implement the remedy while taking no other action (e.g., an 
education campaign). 
The second reason this study includes the information manipulation is because 
it allows me to understand how knowledge of the use tax influences compliance.  As 
discussed above, anecdotal evidence suggests that most individuals have little 
knowledge of the use tax.  Results of the survey in this study lend support to the 
notion that most people have limited knowledge of the use tax.  Given this, it would 
be unlikely that the compliance rate for the use tax would ever increase given that the 
current state of knowledge of the use tax for individuals is virtually zero.  Smith and 
Kinsey (1987) support this claim by stating that in order for individuals to engage in 
the decision making process on whether to comply with a tax, the tax must be salient 
to them.  One of the factors that determines if a tax is salient to the individual is 
whether the individual has information about the tax itself.  Thus, at a bare minimum, 
states will need to inform individuals of what the use tax is and how to comply with 
the use tax.  Stated in hypothesis form: 
H4:  When given information of the use tax, participants’ intention to 
comply with the use tax will be higher than when not given the 
knowledge. 
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An important point warrants further discussion.  This hypothesis is not 
intended to argue that a positive linear relationship exists between an individual’s 
knowledge base of the use tax and use-tax compliance.  Rather, it is built on the 
Smith and Kinsey (1987) argument that before a person can engage in a tax 
compliance decision, he or she must have knowledge of the tax.  In layman’s terms, 
zero knowledge will lead to zero compliance.  Giving an individual the information 
on a tax will allow them to make a tax compliance decision.  The individual may still 
decide not to comply, but the information allows the opportunity for compliance if the 
person chooses. 
It could be argued that individuals, even without information of the use tax, 
could still click the button to have the website automatically collect the tax in the 
remedy condition.  It seems unlikely, however, that individuals would choose to pay 
the use tax using the remedy unless they have some basic knowledge of the use tax.  
In other words, in order for the state to see a significant increase in compliance, the 
state must not only implement the remedy, but also provide some information about 
the use tax to individuals.  Based on this, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H5:  Intention to comply with the use tax will be highest when 
individuals are given information pertaining to the use tax and 
when given the effort remedy. 
 
Method 
The method for testing the remedy uses a 2x2 between-subjects design 
manipulating the effort remedy (no remedy, remedy) and information remedy 
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(present, absent).27  In the information-present condition, participants saw the same 
paragraph describing the use tax shown in the survey and the model validation steps.  
Participants in the information-absent condition did not receive any information 
regarding the use tax.  Participants were then given the same decision scenario as in 
the first two steps of the study.  After reading the scenario the participants saw a 
screen resembling a check-out screen from a typical vendor website.  In the effort 
remedy treatment, participants were given an option to have the website automatically 
collect and remit the use-tax owed to the state in addition to paying a shipping and 
handling charge.  In the no-effort remedy treatment, participants were not given the 
option, but were only shown the purchase price and shipping and handling charges.  
The participants in the effort remedy condition made a decision whether to have the 
website collect the use-tax due.  In the other no-effort remedy condition and in the 
effort remedy condition if the participant chooses not to have the website collect the 
tax, the participant was asked how likely are they to submit the use tax on the 
purchase.  This measure serves as the dependent variable.28  A figure describing the 
conditions can be seen in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 – Experimental Set-up for Remedy 
  Effort Remedy (website collects tax) 
  Present Absent 
Information Present   
Remedy Absent   
    
 
                                                 
27 The instrument used in the Remedy step can be found in Appendix B.  The instrument used in the 
Model validation step was virtually identical except those participants did not have the option to have 
the website collect the use tax. 
28 If the participant chooses to have the website collect the tax, the dependent measure becomes 100. 
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All participants were then asked the identical questions used in the model 
testing phase (i.e., importance of salient beliefs, weights, background). 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty-two graduate and undergraduate students at a large 
university participated in this portion of the experiment.  Demographic data for the 
participants can be found in Table 10. 
TABLE 10 –  
Demographic Data for Participants in the Remedy Step 
 Number % of Total 
Gender   
Male 67 54.92% 
Female 55 45.08% 
Age   
Under 20 24 19.67% 
20 to 29 87 71.31% 
30 to 39 11 9.02% 
40 + 0 0.00% 
Household Income 
Zero to $20,000 55 45.08% 
$20,001 to $35,000 26 21.31% 
$35,001 to $50,000 18 14.75% 
$50,001 to $65,000 7 5.74% 
$65,001 to $80,000 5 4.10% 
$80,001 to $100,000 3 2.46% 
$100,000+ 8 6.56% 
Tax Return Status (2007 Return) 
Single 95 77.87% 
Married Filing Jointly 11 9.02% 
Married Filing Separately 0 0.00% 
Head of Household 2 1.64% 
Qualifying Widow(er) 2 1.64% 
Did Not File 12 9.84% 
                          n = 122 
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The participants in the experiment were similar to the participants in the 
model validation step.  The average participant tended to be under 30, unmarried, and 
had an annual income under $50,000.   
Descriptive statistics pertaining to the participants’ use-tax knowledge and 
internet purchasing habits can be found in Table 11. 
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TABLE 11 – 
Internet Buying Habits and Use Tax Data for Participants in the Remedy Step 
 Number % of Total 
Awareness (Self-Reported, 1 to 7 scale) 
1 (No Knowledge) 80 65.57% 
2 16 13.11% 
3 11 9.02% 
4 7 5.74% 
5 5 4.10% 
6 1 0.82% 
7 (High Knowledge) 2 1.64% 
Purchased Online Before 
Yes 120 98.36% 
No 2 1.64% 
Spent Online in Past Year 
Zero 24 19.67% 
$1 to $100 47 38.52% 
$101 to $500 29 23.77% 
$501 to $1,000 21 17.21% 
$1,001 to $5,000 1 0.82% 
$5,000 + 2 1.64% 
Paid Florida Use Tax Before 
Yes* 8 6.56% 
No 36 29.51% 
Not Sure 78 63.93% 
Paid a Use Tax in any State Before 
Yes 8 6.56% 
No 33 27.05% 
Not Sure 81 66.39% 
                       n = 122 
* To ensure that participants actually had paid the use tax, a follow-up question was used asking whether or not the participant 
had filled out and submitted form DR-15MO.  None of the 8 who indicated they had paid the use tax in the past had filled out 
this form.     
 
The typical participants had little self-reported knowledge on use tax, had 
purchased online before, and either had never paid the use tax or did not recall paying 
the use tax before.   
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Manipulation Checks 
Two manipulation checks were used in this part of the study.  First, 
participants were asked whether or not they were in the effort remedy condition, “Did 
ABC Inc. offer to collect the use tax for you?”  Eleven people missed this question of 
the 122 participants (91% pass rate).  Results did not differ when these participants 
were excluded.   
The second manipulation check asked participants their awareness of the use 
tax before and after taking the experiment on a 7-point scale.  The difference between 
these two questions was then compared between the participants in the group who 
received the information on the use tax and the group who did not.  The results 
showed a significant difference in the increase in the amount of awareness on the use 
for those participants who received the information on the use tax over those who did 
not receive the information (p-value < .001).29  This result indicates successful 
manipulation of information. 
Assumptions of ANOVA 
For ANOVA to be the proper statistical technique for analyzing the data, three 
assumptions should be checked:  independence of observations, normality of the 
dependent variable, and equality of variance of the cells.  All observations were 
independent of each other, supporting the first assumption. 
Normality of the independent variable was tested using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test.  Results indicated that the data was not normally distributed (p-value 
                                                 
29 The means (standard deviations) for the manipulation check for the participants in the knowledge 
and no-knowledge conditions were 3.11 (1.64) and 1.41 (1.60) respectively. 
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<.001).  This is not surprising given the nature of the independent variable.  Most 
participants either said there was a very low or very high chance they would comply.  
ANOVA is robust to violations of this assumption depending on the reason why the 
normality assumption was violated (Becker 1998; Pyzdek 2009).  If the violation of 
the assumption is caused by heavy skewness of the data, ANOVA is not the proper 
statistical technique to use.  If the problem is caused by heavier tails, however, 
ANOVA is robust to the violation of the assumption normality.  In this case, the data 
is bimodal (i.e., responses clustered in the tails).  Given the nature of the problem, 
ANOVA is robust to this violation of normality and is still a proper statistical 
technique. 
The equality of variance assumption was checked using Levene’s test.  The 
test revealed that a potential problem with equality of variances (p-value = .007).  
ANOVA, however, is robust to this violation as well if the cell sizes are 
approximately equal (DeCoster 2006).  In this study the cell sizes are approximately 
equal; ANOVA is therefore robust to the violation of unequal variances. 
Results 
Hypotheses 3 through 5 were tested using ANOVA.  The dependent variable was the 
likelihood the participant would pay the use tax on an internet purchase.30  The mean 
compliance rate, standard deviation for the compliance rate, and number of 
participants in each treatment can be seen in Table 12.  ANOVA results can be found 
in Table 13. 
                                                 
30 Likelihood to comply could range from 0 to 100 percent.  As mentioned above, if a person in the 
remedy condition elected to have the website collect the use-tax owed, likelihood was coded as 100.   
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TABLE 12 – 
Cell Mean and Standard Deviations for Treatment Conditions in Remedy Step for Likelihood of Paying the Use Tax 
 Mean Effort remedy (website collects tax)  
 Std. Dev. Present Absent  
    60.68% 25.30% 43.28% 
Information Present 45.87 30.53 42.67 
Remedy   n = 31 n = 30 n = 61 
   48.22% 15.69% 32.75% 
 Absent 44.20 27.05 40.24 
    n = 32 n = 29 n = 61 
    54.35% 20.58%  
    45.10 29.03  
    n = 63 n = 59  
 
 
TABLE 13 – 
ANOVA Results 
Source 
Type III Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 
38557.217 3 12852.4 8.859 <.001 
Intercept 
171071.043 1 171071 117.915 <.001 
Effort Remedy Condition 
35113.834 1 35113.8 24.203 <.001 
Information Remedy Condition 
3708.696 1 3708.7 2.556 0.114 
Interaction 
61.778 1 61.778 0.043 0.837 
Error 
171194.75 118 1450.8 
    
Total 
386072 122 
      
Corrected Total 
209751.967 121 
      
R2 = .184 / Adjusted R2 = .163     
 
The results indicate that participants in the effort remedy condition are more 
likely to comply than participants in the non-remedy condition (p-value < .001).  This 
provides strong support for Hypothesis 3, and indicates that the remedy proposed 
would increase compliance on the use tax.  In addition, Hypothesis 4 is also supported 
(p-value = .057, one-tailed test).  This indicates that providing information to 
individuals will also increase compliance on the use tax.  Finally, there was no 
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significant interaction (p-value = .837).  Thus, Hypothesis 5 is not supported.  Two 
possible explanations for this exist.  First, these two remedies are mutually 
independent of each other and there is simply no interaction (i.e., they will each 
improve compliance at the same rate regardless of whether the other is present).  The 
second potential explanation is that perhaps there is a confounding problem between 
the two remedies.  Specifically, that the effort remedy manipulation is providing 
information about the use tax and, thus, is masking the interaction effects.  This 
potential explanation is explored in the Supplementary Results section. 
Next, to determine why exactly people were more likely to comply in the 
Remedy condition, multiple t-tests were run comparing salient belief scores for the six 
salient beliefs between participants in the remedy and non-remedy conditions.31  
Results of the t-tests can be found in Table 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 T-tests compared only the scores between the remedy conditions for people who received 
information on the use tax.  Factor load values determined in the model validation step were used to 
determine the salient belief values in this step. 
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TABLE 14 – 
T-Tests Comparing Salient Beliefs between Participants in the Effort Remedy Conditions 
Salient Belief No Remedy Remedy T-Test 
  (Std Dev.) (Std. Dev.) P-Value (2-Tailed)  
Effort 97.42 64.37 
3.272 
  (64.37) (42.99) 
0.002  
FundingState 29.57 35.27 
-1.234 
  (17.32) (18.67) 
 0.222 
MonConcerns 22.90 23.39 
-.141 
  (13.08) (13.87) 
 0.888 
Knowledge* 14.93 17.58 
-1.10 
  (7.52) (11.01) 
 0.276 
Fairness 13.40 15.23 
-0.894 
  (7.21) (8.64) 
 0.375 
AnotherTax 41.70 49.07 
-1.446 
  (19.63) (20.11) 
 0.153 
* - Equity of variance tests revealed that the salient belief Knowledge did not have equal variances.  The t-test for Knowledge 
was used then assuming non-equal variances. All other reported p-values assume equal variances. 
 
The only salient belief score that was significantly different was the Effort (p-
value = .002).  This finding indicates that the only thing that differed between 
participants in the two conditions was the Effort salient belief.  This result supports 
the conclusion that the effort remedy lowered effort and this lowering of effort 
increased compliance. 
Supplementary Analysis 
Additional t-tests were run comparing the effort remedy conditions.  The first 
test examined whether the participant would buy from the website in the future (7-
point scale).  This question was asked to determine whether the effort remedy would 
have a negative impact on future buying behavior, a potential concern for website 
vendors.  Results indicate that there is not a significant difference of future buying 
64 
 
habits of participants in the effort remedy present and absent condition (p-value = 
.109).   
The second t-test dealt with the question regarding the perceived likelihood 
that Florida (the state where the use tax would be applicable) would find out about the 
purchase.  Participants were asked how likely they thought it was that Florida would 
find out about the purchase (7-point scale).  This question was asked due to the 
potential concern that a person would feel it more likely they would be caught non-
complying in the remedy condition if they selected not to have the website collect.  
There was no significant difference in a person’s perceived likelihood they would get 
caught between the effort remedy present and absent conditions (p-value = .559). 
Finally, t-tests were run to check to ensure that the effort remedy did not add 
any additional information to the participants.  Specifically, a potential confounding 
problem could occur if the effort remedy was, by itself, providing information to the 
participant on the use tax.  Two t-tests were conducted comparing Knowledge scores 
between participants in the effort remedy present and absent conditions within the 
information present and absent conditions.  No significant results were found.  
Specifically, there was no significant difference between the Knowledge scores in the 
effort remedy present and absent conditions within the information present condition 
(p-value = .666) or within the information not present condition (p-value = .230).  
These results provide support for the position that the effort remedy did not itself 
enhance knowledge of the use tax, which was the intent of the separate information 
remedy. 
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VI. Conclusion 
This study investigated use-tax compliance using a three-step approach.  The 
first step involved building a survey based on the suggestions of Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1980) to determine potential factors (termed salient beliefs) that are pertinent to 
individuals when facing a use-tax compliance decision.  Results of the initial survey 
reveal that the effort of complying with the use tax, potential revenue to the state if 
the individual complied, fairness of the use tax, monetary concerns of the individual, 
perceived knowledge of the use tax, and social influences were the most mentioned 
factors contributing to individuals’ use tax compliance decisions. 
The second step in this study develops a model, based on the Theory of 
Planned Behavior, incorporating these salient beliefs.  Results of the model testing 
indicate that the salient beliefs Effort, Funding for State, Fairness, and Another Tax 
identified in the survey were correlated to an individual’s attitude.   
Finally, the third step involved testing remedies that (1) provided explicit 
information about the use tax on the web site at the time of purchase and (2) gave the 
individual the option to have the website automatically collect the use tax due.  
Results indicate that both remedies increased use-tax compliance – compliance 
increased when individuals were given more knowledge on the use tax and also when 
presented with the option to have the website automatically collect the use tax.  
Interaction effects, however, were not significant. 
The results of this study contribute to the academic accounting literature and 
have implications for policy makers.  First, this study expands tax compliance 
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research into a relatively unexplored tax.  Virtually all prior empirical tax compliance 
research has focused on the income tax.  Specifically, prior research has focused on 
the federal income tax.  Given the multitude of differences between different types of 
taxes, it is important to begin to explore whether or not compliance decisions differ 
based on the tax in question.  
Second, this study identifies six specific factors that help to explain an 
individual’s use-tax compliance decision. These results give policy makers and future 
researchers specific areas to explore when trying to find solutions for the use-tax 
compliance problem. 
Third, this study provides some evidence that factors that influence a tax 
compliance decision change based on the tax in question.  Specifically, the factors 
that influence a use-tax compliance decision are different from the factors that 
influence a federal income tax compliance decision.  Specifically the Effort, Funding 
for the State, Monetary Concerns, Knowledge, and Another Tax salient beliefs were 
different from the salient beliefs determined in Bobek and Hatfield (2003).  This 
result gives support to the conclusion that it is not prudent for policy makers and 
researchers to look for compliance solutions for a tax based on prior federal tax 
research.  One must take into account the specific tax in question. 
Fourth, this study provides policy makers with two potential solutions to the 
use-tax compliance problem.  The first potential solution involves having internet 
vendors give the customer a choice whether or not the website would automatically 
collect the tax.  This solution would be beneficial to the state, by increasing use-tax 
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revenue, without hurting internet vendors’ profit (i.e., those customer who do not 
wish to pay the use tax do not have to and website could still collect the profits).  This 
solution could be viewed as a compromise between the state forcing the vendor to 
collect the use tax and the website not having to do anything. 
The second potential solution this study offers states would not involve any 
new law.  Simply improving the residents’ knowledge base of the use tax would also 
improve compliance.  This could be accomplished by an advertising campaign.  This 
is a low cost remedy for a potentially large tax revenue gain. 
There are several limitations of this study that should be considered when 
interpreting the results.  First, participants all came from one state that does not have 
an income tax and, thus, participants do not have an income tax return to fill out that 
has a line item pertaining to the use tax.  Different states have different use-tax 
compliance rules and regulations and, perhaps, publicity regarding their use tax.  
Future research could replicate the study using participants from a state that does 
have a state income tax to determine whether the results differ when participants 
potentially have increased awareness of their state-level tax obligations.  A second 
potential limitation is that the amount of use tax due did not vary, but was held 
constant throughout all steps.  It is unclear whether people would behave differently if 
more or less use tax was owed.  Third, the type of information provided was not 
manipulated in anyway.  Providing slightly more or less information or changing the 
wording on the information might lead to different compliance decisions.  Finally, 
only one coder was used when deriving the salient belief list.   
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This paper provides several avenues for future research.  First, research could 
compare the proposed remedies in this study to remedies implemented by states (i.e., 
line item on tax return).  Second, research could continue to explore differences 
between federal and state taxes.  For example, are there potential differences between 
a state and federal income tax compliance decision?  Third, research could examine in 
more detail the specific factors identified in this study.  For example, what are the 
psychological factors behind the salient belief Another Tax?  Fourth, research could 
potentially examine the most optimal way to improve knowledge on a tax.  This 
current study did not manipulate the type or amount of information received on the 
use tax.  Future research could also examine what specific pieces of information are 
useful for improving compliance.
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Appendix A:  Initial Survey Instrument 
 
Survey on the Florida Use Tax  
 
 
Researcher: 
 
Chris Jones 
The University of South Florida 
COB – School of Accountancy 
Tampa, FL  33620-5500 
jonesc@coba.usf.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Instructions 
 
In completing this survey you will be asked to answer questions relating to state taxes.  The 
survey also contains general questions related to your background.  Please answer the 
questions as if you were actually faced with the decisions described.  Your responses to all 
questions will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being combined 
with data from all other participants.  Please do not put your name, social security number, 
school ID, or any other identifying information on the materials.   
 
There are no right or wrong answers.     
 
By completing the case and related questions, you agree to voluntarily participate in this 
survey.   
 
This study is NOT affiliated with the Florida Department of Revenue or the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).  The information provided in this survey will only be used by the 
researcher listed above for his research. 
 
Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated.  If you have any questions or 
comments, please feel free to email the researcher listed above.   
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Many states (and the federal government) impose taxes of which individuals may 
have little or no knowledge.  We are interested in understanding individuals’ 
knowledge of one specific tax called the use tax.  In the space provided below, 
please describe everything you know about the use tax.  Note:  If you do not 
know anything about the use tax please just put, “I have never heard of a use tax.” 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
-
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
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The following paragraphs define what a use tax is.  Do NOT go back and change what 
you wrote on the previous page. 
 
Definition 
A use tax is a tax imposed by the state to use, store, or consume an item in the state.  
For example, if you purchase a television in Georgia to use in your apartment in 
Florida, you might be subject to the Florida Use Tax.   
 
A sales tax is collected at the point of purchase from the retailer (vendor), and the 
retailer remits the tax to the state.  Conversely, a use tax is paid by the individual 
directly to the state. 
 
Generally, states offer a credit for any sales tax paid in another state.  That is, 
individuals typically do not have to pay both use tax and sales tax on the same item.   
 
To pay the use tax in Florida, an individual must fill out and submit Form DR-15MO 
(Florida Department of Revenue Out-of-State Purchase Return) on a quarterly basis.   
 
Online Purchases 
Often times when an individual makes a purchase online, no sales tax is charged.  
Generally in this situation, the individual would owe a use tax to the state where the 
product is used.  For example, suppose you purchase a DVD player from 
Amazon.com for use in your home in Florida.  If Amazon.com does not charge a sales 
tax at the time of your purchase, you would owe the use tax to the state of Florida. 
 
Currently, the use tax rate in Florida is 6%.  If the DVD player in the preceding 
example cost $100, it would be your responsibility to submit the $6 use tax to the state 
of Florida. 
 
Instructions for proceeding 
Based on the use tax information provided above, please read the scenario on the next 
page and answer the questions that follow.   
 
 
 
 
80 
 
Internet Purchase Scenario 
 
You recently received a gift of $250 for your birthday.  After thinking about it for a 
few days you decide to purchase an 8 GB Apple iPod Touch with the money.  You 
shop around and look online for the best deal.  You find a website selling the 8 GB 
Touch for $200.  You decide to place your order with the website.  You notice the 
website does not charge a sales tax on the purchase. 
 
The Florida Use Tax due on this purchase is $12.00 (6% of $200) and this amount is 
not withheld by the internet site where you made your purchase.  So to comply with 
the Florida Use Tax, you will need to complete and send Form DR-15MO with a 
$12.00 check to the Florida Department of Revenue.   
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• The following question asks your opinion on paying the Florida Use Tax 
• You may look back at the scenario at any point while answering the question 
• There are no right or wrong answers 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Please list all the advantages and disadvantages of paying the Florida Use Tax on this 
purchase.  What else do you associate with paying the Florida Use Tax on this 
purchase? 
 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
82 
 
• The following questions relate to your background information. 
• Please check or circle your response unless otherwise indicated.  
  
 
 
1.  Gender:   
 
____Female  ____ Male 
 
2.  Age: 
 
____ Under 20 ____ 50 – 59 
____ 20 – 29  ____ 60 – 69 
____ 30 – 39  ____ 70+ 
____ 40 – 49 
 
3.  Education Level (please mark the selection that best describes your education status): 
 
____ Currently pursuing a bachelor’s degree   
____ I have a bachelor’s degree 
____ Currently pursuing a master’s degree    
____ I have a master’s degree 
____ Currently pursuing a doctoral degree   
____ I have a doctoral degree 
____ Other    Please describe _____________________ 
 
4.  Tax Return Status (on 2007 return): 
 
____ Single    ____ Head of Household   
____ Married Filing Jointly   ____ Married Filing Separately  
____ Qualifying Widow(er) with Dependent Child  
____ Did Not File 
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5.  What is your household income? 
 
____ Zero - $20,000   ____ $65,001 - $80,000 
____ $20,001 - $35,000  ____ $80,001 - $100,000 
____ $35,001 - $50,000  ____ $100,000+ 
____ $50,001 - $65,000 
 
6.  How many years of work experience do you have? 
 
____ Years  ____ Months 
 
7.  Have you ever purchased an item via the internet? 
 
____ Yes 
____ No 
 
8.  If you answered “Yes” to Question #7 – in general, on your online purchases, please 
estimate the percentage of vendors that collect a sales and/or use tax by making a 
slash mark (“/”) at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
 
|--------- |--------- |---------|---------|----------|---------|--------- |--------- |--------- |--------- |  
 0%     10        20        30        40         50       60        70        80        90       100% 
 
9.  In the past year, what is your estimate of how much you have spent on purchases 
made via the internet (in dollars)? 
 
____ Zero   ____ $1,001 to $5,000 
____ $1 to $100  ____ $5,001 to $10,000 
____ $101 to $500  ____ $10,000+  
____ $501 to $1,000 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
10.  How often would you estimate you purchase an item via the internet? 
 
____ Once a year           ____ Multiple times during a year (but not monthly)  
____ Once a month           ____ Multiple times during a month (but not weekly) 
____ Once a week           ____ Multiple times during a week (but not daily) 
____ Once a day           ____ Multiple times during a day 
  ____ I do not make purchases via the internet 
11. Have you ever paid a use tax in Florida? 
 
____ Yes 
____ No 
____ Don’t know 
 
12. Have you ever paid a use tax in any state? 
 
____ Yes 
____ No 
____ Don’t know 
 
13. Have you ever taken a tax course at USF or any other college or university? 
 
____ Yes 
____ No 
____ Don’t remember 
 
14. Please indicate how strongly you agree with the following statement by making a 
slash mark (“/”) at the appropriate place on the scale below. 
 
 I think it would be morally wrong to engage in tax evasion. 
 
Strongly                  Strongly 
Disagree                    Agree 
|--------- |--------- |---------|---------|----------|---------|--------- |--------- |--------- |--------- |  
0        10        20        30        40         50       60        70        80        90       100 
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Appendix B:  Remedy Instrument  
 
Experiment Examining the Florida Use Tax  
Researcher: 
Chris Jones 
The University of South Florida 
COB – School of Accountancy 
Tampa, FL  33620-5500 
jonesc@coba.usf.edu 
 
General Instructions 
  
In completing this survey you will be asked to answer questions relating to state taxes.  
The survey also contains general questions related to your background.  Please answer 
the questions as if you were actually faced with the decisions described.  Your responses 
to all questions will remain strictly confidential and will be analyzed only after being 
combined with data from all other participants.  Please do not put your name, social 
security number, school ID, or any other identifying information on the materials.   
  
There are no right or wrong answers.     
  
By completing the case and related questions, you agree to voluntarily participate in this 
survey.   
  
This study is NOT affiliated with the Florida Department of Revenue or the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS).  The information provided in this survey will only be used by the 
researcher listed on the previous slide. 
  
Your participation in this survey is greatly appreciated.  If you have any questions or 
comments, please feel free to email the researcher listed on the previous page.   
The following paragraphs define what a use tax is.   
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Definition 
A use tax is a tax imposed by the state to use, store, or consume an item in the state.  For 
example, if you purchase a television in Georgia to use in your apartment in Florida, you 
might be subject to the Florida Use Tax.   
  
A sales tax is collected at the point of purchase from the retailer (vendor), and the retailer 
remits the tax to the state.  Although the use tax could be potentially withheld by the 
vendor, it is often paid by the individual directly to the state. 
  
Generally, states offer a credit for any sales tax paid in another state.  That is, individuals 
typically do not have to pay both use tax and sales tax on the same item.   
  
Assuming the internet vendor does not withhold the use tax due, to pay the use tax in 
Florida, an individual must fill out and submit Form DR-15MO (Florida Department of 
Revenue Out-of-State Purchase Return).  
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Online Purchases 
Often times when an individual makes a purchase online, no sales tax is charged.  
Generally in this situation, the individual would owe a use tax to the state where the 
product is used.  For example, suppose you purchase a DVD player from Amazon.com 
for use in your home in Florida.  If Amazon.com does not charge a sales tax at the time of 
your purchase, you would owe the use tax to the state of Florida. 
  
Currently, the use tax rate in Florida is 6%.  If the DVD player in the preceding example 
cost $100, it would be your responsibility to submit the $6 use tax to the state of Florida. 
  
Instructions for Proceeding 
Based on the use tax information provided above, please read the scenario on a following 
page and answer the questions that follow.   
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On the next page you will be shown a scenario in which you will be asked to make a 
compliance decision about whether you would pay a use tax.  Before proceeding, take a 
moment to think about use tax.  Please feel free to go back and reread the use tax 
definition by hitting the "<<Back" button located on the bottom right portion of the 
screen if you feel it is necessary.   
 
When you are ready, please hit the "Next>>" button to proceed to the scenario. 
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Internet Purchase Scenario 
  
 
  
You recently received a gift of $250 for your birthday.  After thinking about it for a few 
days you decide to purchase an 8 GB Apple iPod Touch with the money.  You shop 
around and look online for the best deal.  You find a website (ABC Inc.) selling the 8 GB 
Touch for $200.  You decide to place your order on ABC Inc.’s website.  You notice 
ABC Inc. is an out-of-state vendor and does not charge a sales tax on the purchase.  So 
you owe a $12.00 ($200 x 6%) use tax to Florida. 
 
  
  
The use tax amount is not withheld by the internet site where you made your purchase.  
So to comply with the Florida Use Tax, you will need to complete and send Form DR-
15MO with a $12.00 check to the Florida Department of Revenue.  
  
  
The next page shows the order form on ABC Inc.’s website.  
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ABC Inc. 
   
Please review your purchase 
  
Description                                                                     Price 
     ·     Item #1001 8 GB Apple iPod Touch                                  $200.00 USD 
  
  
Shipping and Handling                                                             $5.00 USD 
  
  
Sales and Use Tax 
·  Sales Tax                                                                                          $0.00 USD 
  
·  Use Tax*                                                                                          $0.00 USD 
  
 TOTAL                                                     $205.00 USD 
  
 
*Based on your shipping information, you may be subject to the Florida Use Tax.  You 
are responsible for paying any use tax associated with this purchase.  Note that ABC Inc. 
WILL NOT disclose to FLORIDA any information pertaining to this purchase. 
 
 
  
If this information is correct please select the "Next>>" button located on the bottom 
right portion of the screen.  If you wish to return to the previous screen select the 
"<<Back" button. 
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Compliance Decision 
  
How likely are you to fill out Form DR-15MO and pay the Florida Use Tax on this 
purchase (0 to 100, with 0 indicating a 0 percent likelihood you would pay and 100 being 
a 100 percent likelihood you would pay)?  
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Questions 
 
The following questions relate to various issues associated with previous screens. 
  
  
There are no right or wrong answers 
  
Before getting to the check-out screen, how much information was presented to you in 
this experiment on the use tax?  
1 (No 
information 
was 
presented)  
2  3  4  5  6  
7 (Much 
information 
was 
presented)  
   
 
 
Did ABC Inc. offer to collect the use tax for you? 
Yes  
No  
 
How much awareness of the use tax did you have before taking this experiment?  
1 (None)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (A lot)  
   
 
How much awareness of the use tax, based on information presented in this experiment, 
do you have now?  
1 (None)  2  3  4  5  6  7 (A lot)  
   
 
Assuming ABC Inc. actually existed, how likely would you be to purchase from their 
website in the future?  
Very 
Unlikely  Unlikely  
Somewhat 
Unlikely  Undecided  
Somewhat 
Likely  Likely  Very Likely 
   
 
How likely is it that Florida would find out about this purchase?  
Very 
Unlikely  Unlikely  
Somewhat 
Unlikely  Undecided  
Somewhat 
Likely  Likely  Very Likely 
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The following questions ask your opinion on various issues associated with paying the 
Florida Use Tax and on your compliance decision. 
  
You may go back and look at the scenario and/or use tax definition at any time by hitting 
the "<<Back" button located on the bottom right portion of the screen. 
 
  
There are no right or wrong answers 
  
Paying the use tax on this purchase would be a hassle.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
 
The hassle involved in paying the use tax on this purchase was _______ to me when 
making my compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
Paying the use tax on this purchase would require effort.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
The effort involved in paying the use tax on this purchase was _______ to me when 
making my compliance decision.  
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
Paying the use tax on this purchase would be inconvenient.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
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The inconvenience involved in paying the use tax on this purchase was _______ to me 
when making my compliance decision.  
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
Paying the use tax on this purchase would be time consuming.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
The amount of time it would take to pay the use tax on this purchase was _______ to me 
when making my compliance decision.  
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
Paying the use tax on this purchase would give Florida more money.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
The fact that payment of the use tax on this purchase would result in Florida receiving 
money was _______ to me when making my compliance decision.  
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
Florida would benefit if I pay the use tax on this purchase.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
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The fact that Florida would benefit if I would pay the use tax was ________ to me when 
making my compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
Paying the use tax on this purchase would affect my finances.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
The effect payment of the use tax would have on my finances was ________ to me when 
making my compliance decision.  
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
I think I know a lot about the use tax.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
The amount of knowledge I have on the use tax was ________ to me when making my 
compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
I think the use tax is fair.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
 
96 
 
The fairness of the use tax was ________ to me when making my compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
I think of the use tax as another tax among a multitude of taxes.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
The fact that the use tax is just another tax among a multitude of taxes was ________ to 
me when making my compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
I think of the use tax as just another way the government is trying to get my money. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
The fact that the use tax is just another way the government is trying to get my money 
was ________ to me when making my compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
My family would want me to pay the use tax on this purchase. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
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Whether my family would want me to pay the use tax on this purchase was ________ to 
me when making my compliance decision.  
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
My friends would want me to pay the use tax on this purchase. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
Whether my friends would want me to pay the use tax on this purchase was ________ to 
me when making my compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
My co-workers would want me to pay the use tax on this purchase. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
Whether my co-workers would want me to pay the use tax on this purchase was 
________ to me when making my compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
I believe I have the ability to pay the use tax on this purchase.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
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Whether I have the ability to pay the use tax on this purchase was ________ to me when 
making my compliance decision.  
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
I believe I have access to all necessary items/resources that are needed to pay the use tax 
on this purchase. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
Whether I have access to all necessary items/resources that are needed to pay the use tax 
on this purchase was ________ to me when making my compliance decision. 
Not at all 
Important  
Very 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Neither 
Important 
nor 
Unimportant 
Somewhat 
Important  
Very 
Important  
Extremely 
Important  
   
 
I think it would be morally wrong to try to avoid paying the use tax on this purchase.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
I think it would be unethical to avoid paying the use tax on this purchase.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
I think it would be morally right to pay the use tax on this purchase.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
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I feel it is ethical to pay the use tax on this purchase. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
I have a positive attitude towards paying the use tax on this purchase. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
 
I think paying the use tax on this purchase is a good idea. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
 
I think paying the use tax on this purchase would be a wise idea.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
I like the idea of paying a use tax on this purchase. 
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
People who influence my behavior think I should pay the use tax on this purchase.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
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People who are important to me think I should pay the use tax on this purchase.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
Paying the use tax on this purchase is entirely within my control.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
I have the resources and ability to pay the use tax on this purchase.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
   
 
I would be able to comply with use tax laws for this purchase if I chose to do so.  
Strongly 
Disagree  Disagree  
Somewhat 
Disagree  
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Somewhat 
Agree  Agree  
Strongly 
Agree  
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The following questions relate to your background information.  
 
Gender:  
Male  
Female  
 
 
Age:  
 Under 20  50 - 59  
 20 - 29  60 - 69  
 30 - 39  70+  
 40 - 49      
 
Education Level (please mark the selection that best describes your education status):  
Currently pursuing a bachelor's degree  
I have a bachelor's degree  
Currently pursuing a master's degree  
I have a master's degree  
Currently pursuing a doctoral degree  
I have a doctoral degree  
Other (Please describe)  
 
What is your household income?  For purposes of this question, assume household 
income means the amount of money you have access to in a given year (i.e., you make 
$20,000 a year at a job and your parents give you $15,000 to cover living expenses, your 
household income would be $35,000). 
 Zero - $20,000  $65,001 - $80,000  
 $20,001 - $35,000  $80,001 - $100,000  
 $35,001 - $50,000  $100,000+  
 $50,001 - $65,000      
 
 
Tax Return Status (on 2008 return):  
 Single  Head of Household  
 Married Filing Jointly  Qualifying Widow(er) with Dependent Child  
 Married Filing Separately  Did (or Will) Not File  
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How many months of work experience do you have?  
 
 
 
Have you ever purchased an item via the internet?  
 Yes  No  
 
In general, on your online purchases, please estimate the percentage of vendors that 
collect a sales and/or use tax (0 to 100).  
 
In the past year, what is your estimate of how much you have spent on purchases made 
via the internet (in dollars)?  
 Zero  $1,001 to $5,000  
 $1 to $100  $5,001 to $10,000  
 $101 to $500  $10,000+  
 $501 to $1,000      
 
 
How often would you estimate you purchase an item via the internet?  
 Daily  Once a Month  
 4-6 Times a Week  Several Times a Year  
 2-3 Times a Week  Once a Year or Less  
 Once a Week  Never  
 2-3 Times a Month      
 
Have you ever paid a use tax in Florida?  
Yes  
No  
Don't know  
 
Did you complete form DR-15MO?  
Yes  
No  
Don't know  
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Have you ever paid a use tax in any state?  
Yes  
No  
Don't know  
 
Have you ever taken a tax course at USF or any other college or university?  
Yes  
No  
Don't know  
 
Please list any comments/concerns/questions you have regarding the use tax or this 
survey below.  If you have none, please just put "N/A." 
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